MARY LOUISE THAYSEN, PETITIONER,
v.
DONALD J. THAYSEN, RESPONDENT

Fla. 3d DCA | 1990-02-13
Nos. 89-1163, 89-1503
Before HUBBART, NESBITT and LEVY, JJ.
559 So. 2d 626 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1990) Negative Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

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Synopsis

A former wife sought to increase child support with the State Attorney representing her through the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The court held that the State Attorney lacks statutory authority to participate in child support modification cases when the payor is current on all support obligations, as such cases do not constitute "enforcement of support" under Florida law.


Holding

The State Attorney and Department lack standing to participate in child support modification cases where the payor is current on payments, as such cases do not constitute "enforcement of support" within the meaning of Section 409.2551, Florida Statutes, which applies only to cases involving family desertion and non-support of dependent children.


Headnotes

[1] A petition to increase existing child support, where the payor is current in payments, does not constitute "enforcement of support" under statutes intended for cases of f…

[2] The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the State Attorney's Office lack standing to participate in a private civil proceeding seeking to increase child…

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Key Quotes

“A petition to increase existing child support, where the payor of the existing support is completely current in his payments, is not "enforcement of support". Accordingly, neither the State Attorney's Office nor the Department has standing to participate in such a case, since the children in such cases are not "deserted" or "non-supported".”

The core holding establishing that support modification when payments are current does not fall within the statutory scope of enforcement actions

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties' marriage was dissolved in April 1986 with a property settlement agreement. In September 1988, the marital residence was sold and the form…

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Opinion of the Court
LEVY, Judge.

LEVY, Judge.

In April of 1986, the parties herein had their marriage dissolved by virtue of the entry of a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage. The Final Judgment, which adopted a property settlement agreement, directed that the parties’ marital residence be sold at a later date. The sale of this property was closed in September of 1988, with the former wife [Petitioner] receiving proceeds from the sale in excess of $100,-000.00 in cash.

In March of 1989, acting through the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, the former wife petitioned the trial court for an increase of child support, alleging, inter alia, that “the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement ...” was a party to the action.

The former husband [Respondent] responded to the petition and filed affirmative defenses, including an allegation that he was current in his support payments. The former husband moved to dismiss the former wife’s petition for modification arguing that the former wife had failed to allege why the State Attorney’s Office should be involved in a private, civil matter. The former husband’s Motion to Dismiss further pointed out that the Petition for Modification failed to allege, with specificity, allegations of any substantial change in the circumstances of the parties.

The trial court granted respondent’s Motion to Disqualify the State Attorney.

The petitioner argues that the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services [Department] is statutorily authorized and required, to represent the petitioner herein. Petitioner further points out that the said Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has contracted with the State Attorney’s Office to have the State Attorney’s Office provide the personnel to represent the Department in this case as well as the other cases where the Department enters an appearance in connection with a case where one parent is seeking to enforce court-ordered support.

The parties herein agree that the respondent is completely current in making all of his court-ordered child support payments and, furthermore, that the case before us solely involves the petitioner’s request that the trial court modify the court-ordered child support so as to increase the amount of support that the respondent is ordered to pay.

In view of the foregoing, the trial judge was eminently correct in entering the order disqualifying the State Attorney, acting on behalf of the Department, from representing the petitioner. Section 409.2551, Florida Statutes (1987) specifically points out that it is the intent of the Legislature to have the new provisions contained within Chapter 409 apply to cases involving “... family desertion and non-support of dependent children ...”. A petition to increase existing child support, where the payor of the existing support is completely current in his payments, is not “enforcement of support”. Accordingly, neither the State Attorney’s Office nor the Department has standing to participate in such a case, since the children in such cases are not “deserted” or “non-supported”.

The legislative intent, contained within Section 409.2551, makes it clear that the statutory language in question was added to Florida law to assist in the “... enforcement of support ...” in cases involving the above referred to “... family desertion and non-support of dependent children ...” where the payor is not current in making court ordered child support payments. It does not appear to have been the intent of the Legislature to either burden the already over-burdened Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or to deplete the personnel resources of the State Attorney’s Office by requiring either, or both, of them to replace the use of privately retained counsel in civil proceedings that are private in nature, and which do not involve any allegations of child neglect, desertion, abandonment, or non-support.

We recognize that this decision is in conflict with Wilkerson v. Coggin, 552 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), wherein the Fifth District Court of Appeal interpreted “support enforcement” as including a proceeding seeking to increase the child support obligations of the payor. Certiorari denied.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Thaysen v. Thaysen, 583 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1991)
    …McDONALD, Justice. We review Thaysen v. Thaysen, 559 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), because of conflict with Wilkinson v. Coggin, 552 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Thaysen held that the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) could not…
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  • Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Blue, 564 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …n behalf of a wife, who was not a recipient of government aid, to seek modification of child support previously agreed to by the parties and approved by the court. Wilkinson v. Coggin, 552 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); but see, Thaysen v. Thaysen, 559 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Generally, custodial parents are entitled to judgments for pre-majority arrear-ages. Friedman v. Friedman, 508 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Newman v. Newman, 459 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 466 So. 2d 218 (…
  • Dep't OF Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Massey, 568 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
    …me. This clearly violated the provision of section 61.30 and we reverse for a new support hearing. The father urges that we affirm the lower court because HRS lacks standing to represent Ms. Massey in these proceedings. He cites Thaysen v. Thaysen, 559 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990) for the proposition that Chapter 409, Florida Statutes (1989) only applies to “family desertion and nonsupport of dependent children” cases. He reasons that since he was in compliance with the previous support order and the child…

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