MARY WALKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mary Walker was held in direct contempt and sentenced to six months in jail after admitting she perjured herself at a bond hearing. The court reversed the contempt conviction because Walker was not afforded basic due process protections, including notice of charges, opportunity to consult counsel, or chance to defend herself or present mitigating circumstances.
The contempt conviction and sentence were reversed because Walker was denied fundamental due process protections required even for direct contempt proceedings, and any future contempt proceedings should be conducted as indirect contempt under the applicable rules.
[1] A court has jurisdiction to consider a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of detention notwithstanding the failure of the trial court to enter…
[2] A person accused of direct contempt must be afforded an opportunity to consult with counsel and to defend against the charge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“this record reflects that the appellant was not given an opportunity to consult with a lawyer or to defend herself. She was not informed of the charge, nor was she given an opportunity to show cause or to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances.”
Establishes the critical due process deficiencies that rendered the contempt conviction invalid
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWalker became involved in a domestic assault and her boyfriend was charged with a felony. At a bond reduction hearing, the court learned that Walker h…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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STONE, Judge.
We treat this appeal as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of the appellant/petitioner’s detention. This court has jurisdiction to consider the petition notwithstanding the failure of the trial court to enter a signed written order. Glinton v. Wille, 457 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). By a separate order we directed that the petitioner be released from custody pending further proceedings.
The petitioner was involved in a domestic assault that resulted in the filing ,of felony charges against her boyfriend. She subsequently asked the state to drop the charges. At a hearing to reduce his bond the court was advised that the victim/petitioner recanted her original statement. The court, recalling that she testified in accordance with the initial statement at an earlier bond hearing, recognized that she apparently committed perjury at the first hearing.
The court, without warning or explanation, called the petitioner to the stand. The petitioner admitted, in response to questioning by the judge, that she lied at the first hearing by saying that her boyfriend had threatened her. The court recognized that as a result of her lie the defendant/boyfriend had been kept in jail with a high bond for several weeks. Without more, the court held the petitioner in direct contempt and sentenced her to six months in jail starting immediately. The court rejected the suggestion of the boyfriend’s attorney that the petitioner should first be afforded the opportunity to defend the contempt charge and to consult with counsel.
We recognize that a judgment of contempt is generally entitled to a presumption of correctness. In re Weinstein, 518 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). We also note that technical deviations from rule 3.830, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be excused upon consideration of the totality of the record. B.M. v. State, 523 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Nevertheless, this record reflects that the appellant was not given an opportunity to consult with a lawyer or to defend herself. She was not informed of the charge, nor was she given an opportunity to show cause or to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances. See Kahn v. State, 447 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Keezel v. State, 358 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Laremore v. State, 408 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Jacobs v. State, 327 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
The August 15, 1989 order holding Mary Walker in contempt of court, and the sentence thereon, are reversed. We note that further contempt proceedings against the petitioner, if any, should be conducted as an indirect contempt under rule 3.840, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cf. Bumgarner v. State, 245 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Fox v. State, 490 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Colondro Peters v. State, 626 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…t be first given notice of the charge of contempt of court and the facts on which the charge is based. Then he must be given an opportunity to explain why he should not be adjudicated guilty of contempt before punishment is imposed. Walker v. State, 559 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Scrupulous compliance with rule 3.830 is required because its provisions constitute the essence of due process. Kahn v. State, 447 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); and Keezel v. State, 358 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Here t…
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Hutcheson v. State, 903 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…perjured testimony is involved, the accused must, prior to the adjudication of guilt, be given an opportunity to present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances. See e.g. Tejada v. State, 729 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Walker v. State, 559 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Hutcheson was confronted with his sworn statement, was asked why he should not be held in contempt, and was then cut off when he began to offer an explanation for that statement, with the court announcing it was finding him in c…
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Martin v. State, 711 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…charge of contempt of court and the facts on which the charge is based. Then he must be given an opportunity to explain why he should not be adjudicated guilty of contempt before punishment is imposed.” 626 So. 2d at 1050. See also Walker v. State, 559 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). We have pointed out that “[sjcrupulous compliance with rule 3.830 is required because its provisions constitute the essence of due process.” Kahn v. State, 447 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); and Keezel v. State, 358 So. 2d 247…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Keezel v. State, 358 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- In re Weinstein, 518 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- B.M. v. State, 523 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- Kahn v. State, 447 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Bumgarner v. State, 245 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Jacobs v. State, 327 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Glinton v. Wille, 457 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- FOX v. State, 490 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Walsh v. State, 408 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Laremore v. State, 408 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)