RICARDO MARTINEZ-CID, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
RECY MARTINEZ-CID, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this Florida family law appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reviewed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage involving an 18-year marriage with four minor children. The court affirmed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to the wife but reversed and remanded on the issue of attorney's fees, requiring the husband to pay the wife's full attorney's fees and costs rather than only half.
The court affirmed the award of rehabilitative alimony for six years as a reasonable exercise of discretion, finding the wife capable of self-support with her education and skills. However, the court reversed the attorney's fees award and held that the husband, as the party with superior financial ability to pay, must pay the wife's attorney's fees and costs in full.
[1] Rehabilitative alimony is intended to enable a spouse to develop the capacity for self-support through training or the revival of previous skills.
[2] A trial court's decision regarding rehabilitative alimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, considering factors such as the parties' earning ability, age, health, e…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to 'establish the capacity for self-support of the receiving spouse, either through the development of previous skills or provision of the training necessary to develop potential supportive skills.'”
Establishes the legal standard and purpose for rehabilitative alimony awards that the court applied to affirm the trial court's decision.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRicardo and Recy Martinez-Cid were married for 18 years and had four minor children. The wife, age 38, had worked sporadically in an office during the…
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PER CURIAM.
Ricardo Martinez-Cid appeals a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, an Amendment' and Clarification to Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, an order requiring him to pay half the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs, and a final order requiring him to pay 80% of the special master’s fees and costs. His former wife, Recy Martinez-Cid, cross-appeals, challenging the requirement that Martinez-Cid pay only half her attorney’s fees and costs. In addition, she seeks permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony. We find no merit in the points raised in the husband’s appeal, but agree that one of the wife’s contentions has merit. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The 18 year marriage produced four children, all of whom are still minors. The trial court ordered child support and equitably distributed the marital assets. In addition, the court found that the wife, who was 38 years old and had worked in an office sporadically during the marriage, was entitled to receive rehabilitative alimony for six years. We affirm the decision as to rehabilitative alimony, but modify the order as to attorney’s fees.
The purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to “establish the capacity for self-support of the receiving spouse, either through the development of previous skills or provision of the training necessary to develop potential supportive skills.” Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla.1980); Halberg v. Halberg, 519 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). After reviewing the facts of the case before us, we find that “the trial court’s discretionary authority was reasonably exercised under the test set forth in Canakaris.” Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla.1985). Canakaris announced the criteria to be used in determining the wife’s needs as including “the parties’ earning ability, age, health, education, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed during its course, and the value of the parties’ estates.” Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201-02. The record before us demonstrates that the wife is young and capable of rehabilitating herself. See Askegard v. Askegard, 524 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). She possesses an undergraduate college degree as well as a real estate sales license (not current) and should be able to prepare for self-support with the six years of rehabilitative alimony the court ordered the husband to pay. At the end of the rehabilitation period, the wife may petition the court for an extension of rehabilitative alimony, if necessary. Mann v. Mann, 555 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
We find, however, that the trial court erred in failing to require the husband to pay all the wife’s attorney's fees and costs.1 Attorney’s fees should be paid by the party who has a superior financial ability to pay. Canakaris; Kuse v. Kuse, 533 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Henning v. Henning, 507 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Although the wife received an equitable distribution of the marital assets,2 she has no immediate earning ability; the husband, however, is employed and has the present ability to pay.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment solely as to attorney’s fees and remand with instructions to the trial court to order the husband to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs in full. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.
. We do not disturb the trial court s ruling as to the master’s fees and costs.
. The wife received the marital home and an adjoining lot.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
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Ugarte v. Ugarte, 608 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…5 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA1990). Furthermore, considering the distribution of assets and the earning abilities of the parties, the former husband clearly has the superior financial ability to pay the fees and costs. See Martinez-Cid v. Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA1990); Kuse v. Kuse, 533 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA1988); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 513 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 2d DCA1987); see also Nisbeth v. Nisbeth, 568 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA1990); Hanks v. Hanks, 553 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 4th DCA1989). We do, h…
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Ardith Nisbeth v. Nisbeth, 568 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…467 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). However, earning capacity is a financial resource which the court can and should consider when determining overall financial circumstances and a party’s ability to pay attorney’s fees. Martinez-Cid v. Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Kuse v. Kuse, 533 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 513 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Poppe v. Poppe, 412 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Hudgens v. Hudgens, 411 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). In this case th…
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Oxley v. Oxley, 695 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ony at that time. See McLean. There is no question that the husband has the ability to pay, as his available income exceeds $45,000 per month. We have considered McCauley v. McCauley, 599 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), Martinez-Cid v. Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and McLauchlin v. McLauchlin, 580 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 182 (Fla.1991), and deem each inapposite. Therefore, we reverse the alimony award with direction that the court either re-examine the rehabilita…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1985)
- Kuse v. Kuse, 533 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Askegard v. Askegard, 524 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Halberg v. Halberg, 519 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Henning v. Henning, 507 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Nate Trachsel v. S.C.K.W., Inc., 555 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Mann v. Mann, 555 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)