SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA TEACHING PROFESSION NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, COLLIER COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, COLLIER SUPPORT PERSONNEL-NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, APPELLEES
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The School Board of Collier County appeals a hearing officer's determination that its rule delegating suspension authority to the superintendent was an invalid delegation of legislative authority. The court reverses, holding that after the 1983 amendment to Florida Statutes section 230.03(2), the School Board had authority to delegate suspension powers to the superintendent, and no statute expressly prohibited such delegation.
The School Board validly delegated the suspension authority to the superintendent. After the 1983 amendment to section 230.03(2), Florida Statutes, the legislature intended to extend the ability of school boards to delegate discretionary authority to superintendents, and because no statute expressly prohibits this delegation, it is not an invalid delegation of authority.
[1] A school board may delegate authority to a superintendent to suspend employees without pay for up to three days if no statute expressly prohibits such delegation.
[2] A specific grant of authority to a school board or superintendent regarding employee suspension does not preclude the school board from delegating other authority not exp…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After the 1983 amendment to section 230.-03(2), Florida Statutes, it is obvious that the legislature intended to extend the ability of school boards to delegate to a superintendent the authority to exercise discretion as set forth in this rule.”
Establishes that the 1983 statutory amendment changed the legal framework to permit the delegation challenged here.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1981, the School Board adopted rule R-18/81 delegating authority to the superintendent to suspend employees without pay for up to three days under …
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RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.
The School Board of Collier County, Florida challenges the finding of the hearing officer that its rule R-18/81 was an invalid delegation of authority. We reverse.
In 1981, the School Board adopted rule R-18/81 entitled “Suspension by Superintendent.” This rule delegates authority for employee suspension without pay to the superintendent under certain circumstances for up to three days. In 1989, appellees brought a petition for determination of the validity of the rule on behalf of their respective members affected by the rule as employees of the School Board. The hearing officer, relying on Johnson v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 403 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), held that the School Board adopted a rule which was an “invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in section 120.52(8)(c), Florida Statutes.”
While a challenge to this rule under section 230.03(2), Florida Statutes, prior to 1983 may have been sustainable, we do not address this issue as it is not before us. After the 1983 amendment to section 230.-03(2), Florida Statutes, it is obvious that the legislature intended to extend the ability of school boards to delegate to a superintendent the authority to exercise discretion as set forth in this rule. Except for the “without pay” portion of the rule, we see very little change in the duties the superintendent exercised before this rule and his duties under the rule presently.
Because we have found no statute, nor have appellees brought to our attention any statute which “expressly prohibits” the School Board from delegating this authority to the superintendent, we find it not to be an invalid delegation of authority. Although there are statutes which specifically grant powers to the School Board and superintendent regarding suspension of employees, see §§ 230.23(5)(f), 230.33(7)(e), 231.36(6), Florida Statutes (1987), these cannot be construed to limit a school board’s power under section 230.03(2) after 1983. The specific grant of authority does not prevent a school board from delegating authority which is not expressly prohibited. Sulcer v. McFatter, 497 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
We find the other points raised on appeal to be without merit. The case is reversed and remanded for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHOONOVER and PARKER, JJ., concur.
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- Sulcer v. McFATTER, 497 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)