THIN DONOVAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This is a dissenting opinion arguing that personal injury protection (PIP) coverage should not apply to injuries sustained from a criminal assault while a person is seated in a parked vehicle with the engine off, when the assailant did not take the vehicle.
The dissent argues that the injuries did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the motor vehicle, and therefore PIP coverage should not apply.
[1] A trial court errs in directing a verdict against a plaintiff after the presentation of that party's case in chief if the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to creat…
[2] In an action by an insured against their insurer for medical expenses, expert testimony is not always required to establish the reasonable and necessary nature of the exp…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe insured was seated in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with the engine off when a third party assaulted them. The assailant did not take the …
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered after the trial court granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case during a jury trial.
We reverse and remand, only one issue being ripe for review; namely, whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict against the plaintiff after presentation of that party’s case in chief.
We conclude it did err. Appellant was injured in an automobile accident on July 9, 1984, and as a result suffered personal injuries which required medical treatment. Appellee and appellant had in effect at the time of the accident an automobile insurance contract including coverage required by the Florida Automobile Reparation Reform Act.
Appellant submitted the required applications for benefits and appellee paid certain medical expenses to treating physicians in the amount of $2,772.
However, since August, 1987, appellee has not paid any further medical expenses (approximately $10,000). Appellant filed suit against appellee for the remainder of these expenses and attorney’s fees and costs.
At trial, appellant presented testimony from the doctors who treated her for her injuries caused by the accident. Appellee moved for directed verdict at the end of appellant’s case stating that section 627.-736(l)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), requires payment for all reasonable expenses for necessary medical and surgical services and appellant did not introduce sufficient evidence as to the reasonable and necessary nature of the expenses claimed by her. In Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 336 So. 2d 566, 571 (Fla.1976), the court said:
Expert testimony was not required in order to render these medical bills admissible in evidence. Mr. Garrett’s testimony made it a question for the jury to decide, under proper instructions, whether these bills represented reasonable and necessary medical expenses.
We disagree that there is one rule for liability cases and another for actions by the insured against his or her insurer. ANSTEAD and POLEN, JJ., concur.