ANNIE J. CORNELL AND JOHN G. CORNELL, APPELLANTS,
v.
WALLACE RUFF, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1932-05-12
105 Fla. 504 Florida Supreme Court (1932) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 141 So. 535
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Annie Cornell, a married woman, fraudulently represented herself as a widow to sell property to Ruff for $11,500. After discovering the deception, Ruff sued for rescission and a constructive trust on property Cornell purchased with the proceeds. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the rescission and constructive trust but reversed the personal deficiency judgment against the married woman.


Holding

The court held that: (1) the bill stated valid equity because misrepresentation of marital status constituted fraud; (2) both properties could be charged in equity and sold because the funds from the fraudulent sale were invested in both lots, making both subject to the constructive trust; and (3) the deficiency judgment was invalid because a personal judgment against a married woman for a deficiency could not be enforced.


Key Quotes

“It is not controverted that when Mrs. Cornell made the contract to sell with appellee she was in fact laboring under the disability of coverture though she represented herself to be a feme sole. Under such a state of facts the law is too well settled to require citation of authority to support it that her deed or contract was ineffective and could not be enforced.”

Establishes that a married woman's contract made while misrepresenting herself as single is ineffective and unenforceable, forming the basis for Ruff's equity claim.

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Facts & Procedural History

In December 1925, Annie Cornell, representing herself as a widow, contracted to sell Lot 2, Block 3 of Orchard Villa to Wallace Ruff for $11,500. Ruff…

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Opinion of the Court
Terrell, J.

Terrell, J.

In December 1925, appellant, Annie J. Cornell, representing herself to be a widow, made a contract with appellee to sell him Lo't 2, of Block 3, of Orchard Villa, according to Platbook 2 page 53, public records of Dade County, Florida, with improvements thereon. The consideration named in the contract was $11,500. of which $7,333.18 with interest was paid. With a portion of the proceeds thus paid appellant purchased Lot 4, Blo'ck 4, Crestwood, according to Platbook 8, page 7 of the public records of Dade County. In April 1929, appellee, as complainant below, having discovered that appellant, Annie J. Cornell, was then and was at the time the contract was entered into, a married woman, instituted this suit to’ rescind the said contract on the ground of fraud and to impress and enforce a constructive trust on the last described lot. A final decree in conformity with the prayer of the bill of complaint resulted, the lands sold for $2,000, and on confirmatiou of the master’s report the Chancellor entered a deficiency decree for $7,819.68 with interest in favor of complainant. This appeal was prosecuted from that final decree.

Appellants urge three questions in this Court, viz: (1) There was no equity in the bill of complaint. (2) If appellee was entitled to any relief it was limited to Lot 2, *506Block 3, of Orchard Villa, according to Platbo'ok 7, page 53,- public records of Dade County, and (3) That part of the final decree embodying the deficiency decree was null and void.

It is not controverted that when Mrs. Cornell made the contract to sell with appellee she was in fact laboring under the disability of coverture though she represented herself to be a feme sole. Under such a state of facts the law is too well settled to require citation of authority to support it that her deed or contract was ineffective and could not be enforced. Section 3801 Revised General Statutes of 1920 (Section 5674 Compiled General Laws of 1927). Carn v. Haisley 22 Fla. 317.

The marital status of Mrs. Cornell was very material to this transaction and its misrepresentation was well within the rule which accords the vendee the exercise of his option to sue for damages or go into equity and rescind the contract and recover the consideration paid for fraud, mistake, or insolvency of the vendor. Langley vs. Irons Land and Development Co., 94 Fla. 1010, 114 So. 769.

We are also convinced that under the facts in this case both lots described herein could be charged in equity and sold to pay the indebtedness due the appellee. The Orchard Villa lot was the separate statutory property of Mrs. Cornell at the time she practiced her deception on the appellee and the funds received by her from appellee fob the spurious sale of said lot were invested in both the Orchard Villa and the Crestwood lots. Both lots, therefore, became her separate statutory property subject to be charged in equity and sold as provided in Section Two of Article Eleven of the Constitution of Florida. Frosen vs. Capo, 88 Fla. 236, 102 So. 158; Citizens Bank & Trust Co. vs. Smith, 97 Fla. 601, 121 So. 900.

As to the deficiency decree it is sufficient to say that this Court has repeatedly held that such a decree against a *507married woman amounted to a personal judgment against her which could not be enforced. Randall vs. Bourgandez, 23 Fla. 264, 2 So. 310; Morgan vs. Simpson, 98 Fla. 1155, 125 So. 350, and many others.

This holding is not in conflict with Vance vs. Jacksonville Realty and Mortgage Co. 69 Fla. 33, 67 So, 636; Wheeler vs. Sullivan, 90 Fla. 711, 106 So. 876; and Citizens Bank & Trust Co. vs. Smith, 97 Fla. 601, 121 So. 900, relied on by appellants. In this case appellee’s money went into both lots and even though appellant’s contract had been void in its inception appellee had a right to enforce the return of his money. Vance v. Jacksonville Realty and Mortgage Co., supra.

It follows that the decree below should be affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Whitfield, P.J., and Davis, J., concur.

Buford, C.J., and Ellis, J., concur in the opinion and judgment.

Brown, J., dissents.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Kerivan v. Fogal, 156 Fla. 92 (Fla. 1945)
    …ections 693.01 and 708.04, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A.), but we cannot dispose of this case solely on that conclusion. See Phillips [*95] v. Lowenstein, et al., 91 Fla. 89, 107 So. 350, cited by appellants. It was decided in Cronell v. Ruff, 105 Fla. 504, 141 So. 535, that a contract to sell executed by a married woman who represented herself to be single was ineffective and could not be enforced, also in Protective Holding Corporation v. Cornwall Company, 127 Fla. 252, 173 So. 804, that a married w…
  • Protective Holding Corp. v. Cornwall Co., 127 Fla. 252 (Fla. 1936)
    …a married woman cannot be enforced. See Lewis and wife [*267] v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418; Rice v. Cummings, 51 Fla. 535, 40 So. 889. And she cannot either at law or in equity bind herself so as to authorize a personal judgment against her. Cornell v. Ruff, 105 Fla. 504, 141 So. 535. Married women can contract and convey property only as provided by law, and void contracts cannot be given effect by the doctrine of estoppel in the absence of a statute permitting it. Wilkins v. Lewis, 78 Fla. 78, 82 So. 762. A marri…
  • Maxwell Baxter v. Thompson, 134 Fla. 494 (Fla. 1938)
    …v. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 136 So. 358; Peace River Phosphate Mining Co. v. Thomas A. Green, Inc, 102 Fla. 370, 135 So. 828; Woodruff v. Lantana Finance Corp, 102 Fla. 950, 136 So. 712; Norris v. Eikenberry, 103 Fla. 104, 137 So. 128; Cornell v. Ruff, 105 Fla. 504, 141 So. 535; International Realty Associates, Inc, v. McAdoo, 87 Fla. 1, 99 So. 120; Bardwell v. Albertson, 120 Fla. 106, 162 So. 321. It is contended by appellant that even if it is admitted that the disputed timber was pointed out prior to signi…

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