ROSE ROSENSTONE, APPELLANT,
v.
HAROLD C. SATCHELL, APPELLEE
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An attorney may be liable for negligence to a non-client if the client intended to benefit that non-client through the attorney's services.
[1] An attorney may be held liable for negligence to a third party when the client's intent in engaging the attorney's services was to benefit that third party.
[2] For a will beneficiary to state a viable cause of action against an attorney, the testamentary intent expressed in the will must be frustrated by the attorney's negligenc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant sued an attorney after her husband's death, alleging the attorney's negligence frustrated their joint wishes regarding his will and trust. T…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Rose Rosenstone, challenges the trial court’s order dismissing her complaint against appellee-attorney, Harold C. Satchell, with prejudice. We reverse.
The dismissal appears to be predicated upon a lack of attorney-client privity between Rosenstone and Satchell in regard to Rosenstone’s deceased husband's will and trust. Both parties acknowledge the judicially-created exception to the privity requirement. In Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Invest, N.V., 512 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla.1987), the court noted that Florida courts traditionally limit attorney liability for negligence in the performance of professional duties to clients with whom the attorney shares contractual privity. An exception is recognized, however, where it can be demonstrated that the apparent intent of the client in engaging the services of the lawyer was to benefit another. For the beneficiary of a will to state a viable cause of action, the testamentary intent as expressed in the will must be frustrated by the attorney’s negligence. Id. at 194. Thus, an attorney may be held liable for breach of his duties to one who engages his services or to one who he knows is the intended beneficiary of his services.
In the instant case, appellant appears to fit within both categories. Her complaint alleges that she was both a client and an intended beneficiary of her husband’s relationship with the attorney. She claims that she and her husband jointly sought the services of the appellee to carry out their joint wishes, but that their wishes were frustrated by appellee’s neglect. It is entirely possible that appellant may fail to prove a case against appellee, but, at this stage of the proceedings, this court must review the pleadings and accept as true all well pled allegations contained in the non-movant’s pleadings. Based on those allegations, we conclude that appellant has at least pled a potential basis upon which to hold appellee liable for negligence.
Accordingly we reverse and remand for further proceedings in accord herewith.
ANSTEAD, STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Espinosa v. Sparber, 612 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1993)…of will drafting, a limited exception to the strict privity requirement has been allowed where it can be demonstrated that the apparent intent of the client in engaging the services of the lawyer was to benefit a third party. Rosenstone v. Satchell, 560 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Because the client is no longer alive and is unable to testify, the task of identifying those persons who are intended third-party benefic…
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Robert J. Brennan, M.D. v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…1378, 1379-89 (Fla.1993) (citation omitted). The only instances in Florida where the rule of privity has been relaxed is where the plaintiff is an intended third party beneficiary of the employment contract. Espinosa; Oberon; Rosenstone v. Satchell, 560 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The material undisputed facts in this case support a legal conclusion that there was no privity of contract between Dr. Brennan and the corporation’s lawyer. It is undisputed that the lawyer was representing the corporation. Th…
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Dingle v. Dellinger, 134 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…hey were contracted to do.2 See First Fla. Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 15 (Fla.1990) (holding accounting firm could be liable for negligence to persons whom it knows and intends will rely on its opinions); Rosenstone v. Satchell, 560 So. 2d 1229, 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (explaining that attorney may be held liable for breach of duties to one who he knows is intended beneficiary of legal services); Admiral Merchs., 494 N.W. 2d at 266 (“[A]n intended third-party beneficiary may bring an acti…
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- Angel v. Oberon Inv., N.V., 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987)