MOORE INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
FOOTHILL CAPITAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Moore International Trucks appeals from a summary judgment finding that defendant Foothill Capital Corporation failed to comply with Florida's motor vehicle lien statute (§713.585) when selling Moore's truck after a lessee defaulted on repair work. The court affirms, holding that the specific motor vehicle lien statute controls over the general personal property lien statute.
Section 713.585, the specific statute governing liens on motor vehicles, controls over section 85.031(2), the general statute governing liens on personal property. Foothill was required to comply with section 713.585 and did not.
[1] A notice of appeal from a non-appealable order may be sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction when the appellate court relinquishes jurisdiction to allow for the entr…
[2] When two statutes cover the same subject matter, the more narrowly drawn statute controls.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When two statutes cover the same subject-matter, the more narrowly-drawn statute controls.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle for resolving conflicts between general and specific statutory provisions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFoothill Capital Corporation performed repair work on a truck owned by Moore International Trucks. The lessee of the truck failed to pay Foothill for …
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LEHAN, Judge.
In this action for, inter alia, replevin and conversion, defendant appeals from a final summary judgment which determined that defendant failed to follow the provisions of section 713.585, Florida Statutes (1987), in selling plaintiff’s truck after plaintiff’s lessee had failed to pay defendant for repair work done on the truck. The trial court ruled that section 713.585, which concerns liens on motor vehicles, governs over section 85.031(2), which concerns generally liens on personal property, and that therefore defendant was not entitled to-choose which section to follow. We affirm.
We first address plaintiff's contention that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. Defendant had initially filed its notice of appeal from the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. This order was of course nonap-pealable. Instead of dismissing the appeal, this court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction so the trial court could enter a final judgment pursuant to Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Plaintiff contends that this appeal should be dismissed because defendant filed no notice of appeal from the final judgment which was entered in accordance with the foregoing order of this court. While plaintiff’s argument has some logic, we do not agree with it.
First, plaintiff was on adequate notice as to what judicial act of the trial court defendant sought to challenge.
Second, neither this court’s order nor Gries required the filing of a second notice of appeal.
Third, despite the fact that the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment was itself nonappealable, the notice of appeal from it was sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction. As Gries explained, “In a purist sense, if we did not have jurisdiction, we had no jurisdiction to relinquish_” Id. at 1282 n.
4.
Thus, we have jurisdiction.
With regard to the merits of this appeal, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled that as between sections 85.031(2) and 713.585, section 713.585 was the controlling statute. Though the two statutes overlap, section 85.031(2) pertains generally to liens on personal property while section 713.585 pertains specifically to liens on motor vehicles. When two statutes cover the same subject-matter, the more narrowly-drawn statute controls. Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla.1959); Floyd v. Bentley, 496 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied, 504 So. 2d 767 (Fla.1987).
As plaintiff argues, it should not be concluded that when the legislature enacted the provisions of section 713.585, which are detailed and comprehensive, are tailored for the type of situation involved here, and were enacted while the more generalized provisions of section 85.031 were in effect, the legislature intended that section 85.031 could continue to govern this situation.
Defendant makes the additional argument that plaintiff had actual notice of defendant’s intent to sell the truck. However, as plaintiff points out, defendant failed to raise this aspect as an affirmative defense. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110(d); Syncom Corp. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 479 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). In any event, the relevant inquiry is whether defendant complied with section 713.585. It is beyond dispute that defendant did not.
Affirmed.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PARKER, J., concur.
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The Better Gov't Ass'n OF Sarasota Cnty., Inc. v. State, 802 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…udgment. The order that grants a motion for summary judgment is likewise not appeal-able, as it lacks the finality of an order entering judgment in favor of a party and against the party opponent. Moore Int’l Trucks, Inc. v. Foothill Capital Corp., 560 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). As this court has routinely done, see id.; L & F Partners, Ltd. v. Miceli, 555 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), and to the extent that it is necessary to do so,1 we relinquish this court’s inchoate jurisdiction for twenty days to…
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Barrio v. James A. Wilson, M.D., 779 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…ion (2), which applies to malpractice suits against health care providers generally. Subsection (6), the more specific provision applicable to suits against emergency room physicians, controls. See Moore Int’l Trucks, Inc. v. Foothill Capital Corp., 560 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Put another way, resort to the exception provided in the more general statute would render the specific statute related to emergency room physicians meaningless. This we are not permitted to do. See Levine v. Levine, 734 So. 2d 1…
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Dep't OF Bus. & Prof'l Reg. v. Fla. Ass'n OF Wholesale Distribs., Inc., 198 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (dismissing appeal of .an order that granted summary judgment, “as it lacks the finality of an order entering judgment in. favor of a party and against the party opponent” (citing Moore Int'l Trucks, Inc. v. Foothill Capital Corp., 560 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990))); Ball v. Genesis Outsourcing Sols., LLC, 174 So. 3d 498, 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“An order that merely grants a motion for summaty .judgment is,not a final order,” (citing Lidsky Vaccaro & Montes, P.A. v. Morejon, 813 So. 2d 146…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kerfert Butler Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959)
- Gries Inv. Co. v. Chelton, 388 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Floyd v. The Honorable E. Randolph Bentley, 496 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Marquez v. Ribero, 479 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Syncom Corp. v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. OF NEW York, 479 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)