MAGGIE P. JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUIS B. JOHNSON, APPELLEE
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Maggie P. Johnson appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the amount of permanent alimony awarded and the trial court's failure to award sufficient attorney's fees and costs. The appellate court affirmed the alimony award but reversed the attorney's fees award and remanded for recalculation based on the parties' disparate financial positions.
The court affirmed the alimony award, finding no obvious abuse of discretion given appellant's ability to contribute some income and the trial court's retained jurisdiction. However, the court reversed the attorney's fees award, holding that the trial court erred in awarding an insignificant portion of fees when the parties had disparate financial positions and appellant lacked income and assets.
[1] A trial court may retain jurisdiction over a dissolution of marriage case to address future alimony obligations if a party is unable to find employment as expected.
[2] The purpose of statutes governing attorney's fees in dissolution of marriage cases is to ensure both parties have a similar ability to secure competent legal counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the purpose of section 61.16, Florida Statutes, is to ensure that both parties have similar ability to secure competent legal counsel”
Establishes the statutory purpose underlying attorney's fees awards in family law cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were in dissolution proceedings. Appellant Maggie P. Johnson had no income and no assets apart from the marital home. Appellee Louis B. Jo…
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GRIFFIN, Judge.
Maggie P. Johnson appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The issues on appeal are whether the trial court abused its discretion in the amount of permanent alimony awarded and in failing to award sufficient attorney’s fees and costs.
As to the alimony award, we agree that the award is low but we are unable to find an obvious abuse of discretion. The record indicates appellant has the ability to contribute some income to the household, especially in view of her relative youth.
We also note that the trial court has retained jurisdiction of the parties and their cause should appellant be unable to find employment as expected. See Peak v. Peak, 411 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to award all of her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with the dissolution proceeding. We agree. This court has recognized in numerous eases that the purpose of section 61.16, Florida Statutes, is to ensure that both parties have similar ability to secure competent legal counsel. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1205 (Fla.1980); Peak v. Peak, 411 So. 2d at 328; Patterson v. Patterson, 399 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Under Canakaris, it is appropriate to award a party attorney’s fees not only when one spouse would be otherwise unable to afford competent counsel, but based on the other party’s “superi-or financial ability” to secure an attorney. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1205.
Here, it is apparent that the parties are not on an equal footing with respect to counsel. At the present time, appellant has no income and no assets, apart from the marital home. By contrast, appellee has already paid his attorney in full from marital assets and has a well-paying job with superior ability to pay appellant’s fees. The trial court erred in awarding her such an insignificant portion of her attorney’s fees and costs. See Akers v. Akers, 518 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Deakyne v. Deakyne, 460 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Peak v. Peak, 411 So. 2d 325, 328 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Accordingly, we remand the award of attorney’s fees to the trial court with instructions to award appellant her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.
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Hallman v. Hallman, 575 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…the reverse is true: the amount of equitably distributed assets is one of the factors to [*744] be taken into account in determining whether an award of fees is appropriate. Nisbeth v. Nisbeth, 568 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 560 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 560 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Inclusion of the fees award may be necessary in this case to help justify the disparity in distribution but it doesn’t help enough to outweigh the mischief it will cause. I…
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Hartman v. Hartman, 761 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…that places the former husband in a vastly superior financial position, relative to the former wife, and which makes the trial court’s ruling an abuse of discretion. See Cervoni v. Cervoni, 715 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Johnson v. Johnson, 560 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Accordingly, we reverse and remand the fee award, for entry of an award of all the former wife’s attorney’s fees and costs. REVERSED and REMANDED. PLEUS, J., and JOHNSON, Jr., W.C., Associate Judge, concur.…
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Johns v. Johns, 598 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…, is to ensure that both spouses have similar abilities to secure competent legal counsel. One spouse need not be completely destitute to merit such an award, if the other has greatly superior financial ability to obtain counsel. Johnson v. Johnson, 560 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). In Canakaris, the husband’s net worth was $3,700,000. The wife was awarded $385,000 plus $7,000 per month alimony. The parties’ financial disparity was close to l-to-10, but the wife in Canakaris also had significant liquid ass…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Peak v. Ewell A. Peak, 411 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Deakyne v. Deakyne, 460 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Patterson v. Patterson, 399 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Akers v. Akers, 518 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)