LAURO MOLINA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Lauro Molina was charged with disorderly intoxication but the State amended the charge on the day of trial to disorderly conduct under a Miami Beach city ordinance. The Florida appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the amendment was prejudicial because the city ordinance contained an exception that Molina had no opportunity to investigate before trial.
The amendment was improper because it created prejudice to the defendant. The city ordinance contained an express exception that was not present in the original statute, and because Molina had no opportunity to investigate this defense before trial, reversible error occurred.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by allowing a last-minute amendment to a charging instrument when the amendment introduces a new offense with an affirmative defense t…
[2] A defendant is prejudiced when a charging instrument is amended to a different offense on the day of trial, if the new offense contains an affirmative defense that the de…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As the ordinance contained a possible defense which Molina had no opportunity to investigate, there was prejudice to Molina from the allowance of the amendment at the outset of trial.”
Establishes the court's holding that the last-minute amendment caused reversible prejudice because Molina could not prepare for a defense specific to the ordinance.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMolina was arrested for consuming beer on a public sidewalk. He was initially charged with disorderly intoxication under Florida Statutes section 856.…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Disorderly Intoxication cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Lauro Molina appeals an order finding him guilty, but withholding adjudication, of disorderly intoxication.1 We reverse.
Molina was charged with disorderly intoxication in violation of section 856.011, Florida Statutes (1985), by consuming beer on the public sidewalk. On the day of trial the State moved to amend to change the charge to disorderly conduct in violation of section 25-33.1, Miami Beach City Code.2 The State argued that the statute and the city code are substantially similar and that there could be no prejudice to the defense by reason of the amendment. Molina argued that he had never previously seen the city code section and had had no opportunity to investigate the nature of the ordinance and the defenses thereto. The trial court allowed the amendment and the case proceeded to trial.
Section 25-33.1 is similar to section 856.-011, Florida Statutes, in that both prohibit consumption of alcohol in a public place. However, the city ordinance contains an express exception for “those areas as designated and approved by the city manager or the city commission.” At the conclusion of the State’s case and at the conclusion of all the evidence, Molina moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the State had not shown the exception to be inapplicable to the area where he was arrested. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the State’s position that the exception within the ordinance was an affirmative defense as to which Molina had the burden of proof. Molina offered no proof, and was convicted.
As the ordinance contained a possible defense which Molina had no opportunity to investigate, there was prejudice to Molina from the allowance of the amendment at the outset of trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial as to that count. See Pedone v. State, 341 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Lawson v. State, 251 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); cf. Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla.1976) (amendment of information to correct technical defect permissible in absence of showing of prejudice to defendant).
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
BASKIN and COPE, JJ., concur. . Molina does not appeal his conviction, and the withholding of adjudication, on the offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. . Section 25-33.1 provides, in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drink, serve or sell any beer, wine or any other alcoholic beverage on any street, sidewalk, pedestrian mall, alley, highway, playground, park or any other public property, in the city, except in those areas as designated and approved by the city manager or the city commission.
JORGENSON, Judge,
dissenting.
Both the arrest affidavit and the arresting officer’s testimony show that Molina was arrested for drinking in public in the 600 block of Sixth Street on Miami Beach.
I would affirm.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gonzalez v. State, 571 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…t of constitutional dimension. Cruz, 465 So. 2d at 518. Accordingly, we see no reason not to treat entrapment like any other affirmative defense in Florida by placing the burden of proving that defense on the defendant.5 See, e.g., Molina v. State, 561 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (defendant in criminal case has burden of proving affirmative defense).6 The entrapment statute also changed the common law defense of entrapment by providing that “[t]he issue of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact.”…
-
Hahn v. State, 626 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…See also Turner v. State, 376 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (defendant’s right to a fair trial was compromised by a day of trial amendment, changing the date of the crime and the degree of the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony); Molina v. State, 561 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (finding prejudice in a day of trial amendment, changing the charge from disorderly intoxication, a violation of a state statute, to disorderly conduct, a violation of a municipal ordinance). At bar, prejudice resulted, as the ame…
Authorities Cited
- Lacros v. State, 339 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1976)
- Lawson v. State, 251 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Pedone v. State, 341 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)