MERA PIERRE,
v.
KIRENIA BUEVEN,
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The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part a final judgment on paternity and child-related matters. The court affirmed the determinations of parental responsibility and time-sharing due to a lack of a hearing transcript, but reversed the portion regarding unsupervised time-sharing because it lacked specific steps for the father to achieve it.
The appellate court held that it could not determine if the trial court abused its discretion regarding parental responsibility and time-sharing due to the lack of a hearing transcript. However, the court held that the final judgment was deficient because it failed to specify the steps the petitioner must take to obtain unsupervised time-sharing.
[1] A trial court's determinations regarding parental responsibility and time-sharing are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
[2] The best interests of the child must be the primary consideration when establishing parental responsibility and creating a time-sharing schedule.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because there is no transcript of the final hearing, this Court is unable to determine whether there was competent, substantial evidence presented below that permitted the lower court to properly evaluate the section 61.13(3)(a)-(t) factors when it made its parental responsibility and time-sharing determinations.”
Explains why the court could not review the parental responsibility and time-sharing determinations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe petitioner appealed a final judgment establishing paternity, parental responsibility, time-sharing, and child support. The appeal specifically cha…
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SCALES, J.
Mera Pierre, the petitioner/counter-respondent below, appeals a May 29, 2018 final judgment establishing paternity, parental responsibility, time-sharing and child support for the parties’ minor child. Pierre challenges only those portions of the trial court’s final judgment determining parental responsibility and time-sharing.
We review these determinations for an abuse of discretion. See Winters v. Brown, 51 So. 3d 656, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“An appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s custody decision unless there is no substantial, competent evidence to support the decision.”). “[T]he best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration” for establishing parental responsibility and creating a time-sharing schedule. § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). “The determination of the best interests of the child is made by evaluating over twenty factors affecting the welfare and interests of the child” that are set forth in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t).
Winters, 51 So. 3d at 658. While it is not necessary for the trial court to address each factor independently, the trial court must make an express finding – either on the record or in the final judgment – that its parental responsibility and time-sharing determinations are in the child’s best interests. Id. Because there is no transcript of the final hearing, this Court is unable to determine whether there was competent, substantial evidence presented below that permitted the lower court to properly evaluate the section 61.13(3)(a)-(t) factors
when it made its parental responsibility and time-sharing determinations. See J.N.S. v. A.M.A., 194 So. 3d 559, 561 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979)).
Similarly, because there is no final hearing transcript, this Court is unable to determine whether the trial court stated, on the record, that unsupervised visitation with Pierre was in the child’s best interests. See Lightsey v. Davis, 267 So. 3d 12, 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (citing Applegate).
Reversal is, therefore, not warranted as to the trial court’s parental responsibility and time-sharing determinations. Because, however, the final judgment fails to provide Pierre with the specific steps he must undertake in order to obtain unsupervised time-sharing with the minor child, we reverse that portion of the final judgment and remand to allow the trial court to identify those specific steps Pierre must undertake to obtain unsupervised time-sharing. See Solomon v. Solomon, 251 So. 3d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“Where a final judgment fails to set forth what steps a parent must take in order to establish unsupervised timesharing, the final judgment must be reversed and remanded for the trial court to identify such steps.”).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.1
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- J.N.S. v. A.M.A., 194 So. 3d 559 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)
- Lightsey v. Davis, 267 So. 3d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
- Solomon v. Sofia Vasquez Solomon, 251 So. 3d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)