DAVID INGRAHAM,

v.

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

PER CURIAM.

David Ingraham was charged with committing first-degree murder (Count I) and attempted first-degree murder (Counts II and III) on March 20, 1989.1 On each of the two attempted second-degree murder counts (Counts II and III), Ingraham was sentenced to thirty years in prison without parole, each sentence to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the life-with-parole sentence on the murder count.2

Ingraham’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Ingraham v. State, 626 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

In 2017, Ingraham filed a motion to vacate his judgments and sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising two claims:¹) his life-1 Additional background can be found in the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1997). Johnson was Ingraham’s co-defendant and was an adult at the time of the offenses. Following a jury trial, Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. That death sentence was affirmed by the Court. 2 Further, the trial court ordered that Ingraham’s life-with-parole sentence for Count I be served consecutively to a twenty-two year sentence previously imposed on Ingraham for second-degree murder with a firearm in circuit court case number 89-21846.

with-parole sentence for first-degree murder violated Miller³ and Graham;4 and 2) his aggregate sentence of sixty years in prison for the non-homicide offenses (two consecutive thirty-year sentences on Counts II and III), to be served at the conclusion of his life-with-parole sentence on Count I, is unconstitutional and contrary to the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in Henry5 and Kelsey.6

The trial court denied Ingraham’s first claim, and we affirm. See Franklin v. State, 258 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 2018); State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 2018).

However, the trial court issued no ruling on Ingraham’s claim that the aggregate sixty-year sentence, to be served at the conclusion of his life-with-parole sentence on Count I, is unconstitutional and contrary to Henry and Kelsey. Although we have the discretion to address this matter in the first instance, we decline to do so, and instead remand this cause for the trial court to conduct any further proceedings as may be appropriate, to make a determination on Ingraham’s second claim, and to render an order accordingly.

Affirmed in part, remanded in part.