BRITNY BOCK
v.
JONATHAN VILMA
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This case concerns whether a Florida court retains jurisdiction over child custody matters after the child has resided in another state for over six months. The appellate court held that the Florida court did retain jurisdiction because it had maintained minimum contacts with the state and the case had been litigated there for an extended period.
No, the Florida court did not lose subject matter jurisdiction. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) does not divest a court of continuing jurisdiction unless virtually all contacts with the forum state have been lost. Where minimum contacts have been maintained with Florida, the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction.
[1] A trial court retains continuing jurisdiction over its prior decree when minimum contacts with the forum state have been maintained, even if the child has relocated.
[2] Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a court does not lose jurisdiction unless virtually all contacts with the forum state have been…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The UCCJEA “does not operate to divest a court of continuing jurisdiction unless virtually all contacts have been lost with the forum state.””
This quote establishes the legal standard for determining if a court loses jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA father filed a petition to modify child support and parenting plan in Florida. The mother, who had previously moved with the child to Maryland, move…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SCALES, J.
Petitioner Britny Bock (the mother) seeks an emergency writ of prohibition from this Court both: (i) to vacate an order denying her motion to dismiss the Respondent Jonathan Vilma’s (the father) second amended petition to modify parenting plan and reduce child support; and (ii) to prohibit the circuit court from making custody or any other determinations regarding the minor child of the mother and father. We deny the petition because the trial court has not acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
I. Relevant Background Facts In June 2016, in lower tribunal case number 16-8230-FC-07, the mother and father domesticated in Florida a May 2015 Louisiana consent paternity judgment that adjudicated, among other things, certain timesharing and support issues related to their minor child.
In May 2018, while the minor child was residing in Florida, the father filed, in the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court, a petition seeking to modify the child support provisions of the domesticated consent judgment. The mother then notified the father of her intent to make a permanent move with the minor child from Florida to Maryland, which she did in August 2018.1 The father amended his petition twice (once on June 13, 2018 and again on July 24, 2018). In his original petition, the father sought a reduction in his child
support obligations due to a change in his income. In his two amended petitions, the father also sought an increased role in his parental responsibilities, particularly because he was aware of and opposed to the relocation of his child. The father amended his petition again on February 27, 2019, to address the material change in circumstances caused by the mother and child’s relocation to Maryland. The mother moved to dismiss the father’s amended petition, arguing, in part, that the child’s residency in Maryland for more than six months caused the Florida court to lose subject matter jurisdiction. It appears from our limited record that the trial court did not rule on the mother’s motion to dismiss, and that two new events intervened to alter the course of the litigation.
First, in April 2019, the mother filed an action in family court in Maryland seeking to, among other things, establish Maryland as the child’s home.
In August 2019, the Maryland court denied the father’s motion to dismiss that action.
Second, the child came to stay with the father in Miami during the summer of 2019. According to the mother, the father refused to return the child to Maryland on a designated date in August 2019, for the start of the school year, and instead enrolled the child in school in Miami.
On August 19, 2019, the mother filed an emergency motion in the Miami-Dade court seeking an order requiring the father to return the child to Maryland. After conducting a four-hour evidentiary hearing over two days, the trial court
denied the motion, without prejudice, on August 27, 2019.
The trial court’s order provided that “[t]he child shall remain in the State of Florida until further ordered by this Court.” The mother then filed her emergency prohibition petition to this Court.
II. Analysis As she did below, the mother asserts here that, because the minor child has been residing in Maryland for over six months, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), as embodied in section 61.501 et seq., Florida Statutes, the Florida trial court no longer has jurisdiction to make child custody determinations.2 We disagree. The UCCJEA “does not operate to divest a court of continuing jurisdiction unless virtually all contacts have been lost with the forum state.” Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d. 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1990).
Where “minimum contacts clearly have been maintained with Florida,” the trial court “has continuing jurisdiction over its own prior decree.” Id. at 1332.
This case has been litigated in Florida for more than three years and the issue of where the child should reside was raised below more than a year ago. The father's June 13, 2018 first amended petition and July 24, 2018 second amended petition both sought a change to the parenting plan in light of the mother’s anticipated move
to Marlyand, which occurred approximately a week after the father filed the second amended petition. Florida was the home state of the child when the father raised custody and shared parenting issues. See Barnes v. Barnes, 124 So. 3d 994, 995-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding that under Florida Statutes section 61.514(1)(a), jurisdictional priority lies in the State where the child resided during the six months prior to the filing of a custody proceeding). The father’s operative petition – his third amended petition of February 27, 2019 – relates back to his initial filings. See Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812, 816 (Fla. 2017). We, therefore, conclude that, in denying the mother’s August 19, 2019 emergency motion, the trial court did not act in excess of its jurisdiction. Petition denied.3
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Cited By
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Litsch v. Litsch, 372 So. 3d 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)
Authorities Cited
- Rona E. Yurgel v. Yurgel, 572 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1990)
- Kopel v. Bernardo Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812 (Fla. 2017)
- Orion Christian Barnes v. Lacey M. Morrison Barnes, 124 So. 3d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)