CECIL ANGELICA IGLESIAS
v.
SERGIO IGLESIAS
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The appellate court reversed a default judgment because the lower court entered it without proper notice to the appellant, who had previously filed a document in the case. The court emphasized that a voluntary dismissal divests the court of jurisdiction to enter further orders.
Yes, the lower court erred by entering the default and default final judgment without providing the appellant with the required notice. A voluntary dismissal divests the court of jurisdiction to enter such orders.
[1] A voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff terminates litigation and divests the court of jurisdiction to enter further orders disposing of the case on the merits.
[2] A party who has filed a document in an action is entitled to notice of an application for default.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As the lower tribunal entered both the default and ensuing default final judgment in the absence of the requisite ‘notice of application’ provided by [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.500(b),” appellant indeed filed “paper” below”
Establishes the basis for the appeal: lack of notice for default judgment after filing a document.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant voluntarily dismissed the underlying action. Subsequently, the lower court entered a default and a default final judgment in favor of th…
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MILLER, J. UPON CONFESSION OF ERROR
Appellant, Cecil Angelica Iglesias, challenges a default and default final judgment entered in favor of appellee, Sergio Iglesias, rendered following the voluntary dismissal of the underlying action.
As the lower tribunal entered both the default and ensuing default final judgment in the absence of the requisite “‘notice of application’ provided by [Florida Rule of Civil Procedure] 1.500(b),” appellant indeed filed “paper” below, Cohen v. Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A., 433 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), and the “voluntary dismissal serve[d] to terminate the litigation [and] to instantaneously divest the court of its jurisdiction to enter or entertain further orders that would otherwise dispose of the case on the merits,” Pino v. Bank of New York, 121 So. 3d 23, 32 (Fla. 2013), based upon our independent review of the record and appellee’s commendable confession of error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
See Pino, 121 So. 3d at 32 (“It is well accepted that the effect of a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal under rule 1.420(a)(1) is jurisdictional.”); Randle-E. Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1978) (“The effect [of a voluntary dismissal pursuant to rule 1.420(a)] is to remove completely from the court’s consideration the power to enter an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of ‘jurisdiction.’”); Cohen, 433 So. 2d at 1354-55 (finding that a party who has filed a “paper” in the action is entitled to adequate notice of the application for default under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b), and that the notice should be “given in sufficient time
to permit some meaningful action to be taken upon it after its receipt”); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b) (“[T]he court may enter a default against [a party against whom affirmative relief is sought]; provided that if such party has filed or served any document in the action, that party must be served with notice of the application for default.”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.080(a) (“[A]ll orders, and every other document filed in the action must be served in conformity with the requirements of Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.516.”).
Reversed and remanded.
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)
- Pino v. The Bank OF NEW York, 121 So. 3d 23 (Fla. 2013)