RICARDO PEREZ AND LUZ PEREZ,

v.

GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL.,

PER CURIAM.

In GEICO Indemnity Co. v. Perez, 260 So. 3d 342 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“Perez I”), this Court: (i) affirmed the trial court’s legal determination that GEICO was not entitled to section 627.727(1)’s¹ conclusive presumption that Perez had rejected uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage under his automobile policy because GEICO’s UM rejection form failed to track the precise disclaimer language set forth in the statute; but (ii) remanded for a new trial on the issue of whether Perez made a knowing, written rejection of UM coverage. Because we had already determined that GEICO was not entitled to the statute’s conclusive presumption, we expressly noted in footnote nine of Perez I that we need not reach the issue of whether the trial court had erred by determining GEICO’s click-through process also failed to comply with the statute. Id. at 352, n.9. In our view, the practical result of either alleged statutory violation was the same: GEICO’s forfeiting the statute’s conclusive presumption that Perez had waived UM benefits, with GEICO having to prove Perez made a knowing, written rejection of UM coverage.² Thus, because the adequacy of GEICO’s online click-through process

had no bearing on GEICO’s ability to proceed to trial in this case, this Court declined to reach that issue. The instant “Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Certiorari” is, therefore, denied.

reversed the jury’s verdict for GEICO, concluding that, “allow[ing] an insurance company to prove that an insured orally and knowingly rejected stacked [UM] coverage . . . would undermine the legislature’s determination that such written notice is mandatory.” Id. at 999. As we noted, though, in Perez I, this case is not about an oral rejection of UM coverage. Perez I, 260 So. 3d at 353. GEICO’s claim in this case, as expressly noted in our Perez I remand instructions, is that Perez made a knowing, written rejection of UM coverage. Id. at 354.