MIAMI-DADE COUNTY

v.

ROBERTO ARTILES MOREJON, ET AL.,

GORDO, J.

Miami-Dade County, a non-party to the proceedings below, petitions for a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court’s order denying its motion for protective order. Respondents Martex Corporation and Maintenance Authority Professional Services Inc. (collectively, “Respondents”)¹ listed County Building Official Jamie Gascon as an expert witness. The County sought to preclude the parties to the underlying action from taking Mr. Gascon’s testimony as he was neither a fact witness nor a retained expert. The County argues that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law by compelling Mr. Gascon to testify as an expert without having been paid fees and by allowing Respondents to call him as a fact witness when he has no personal knowledge of the case. For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition and quash the trial court’s order.² AVAILABILITY OF RELIEF BY CERTIORARI

“To invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of this court, a petitioner must demonstrate a departure from the essential requirements of the law which results in a material injury for which there is no adequate remedy on appeal.” State v. Hernandez, 278 So. 3d 845, 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (quoting State v. Styles, 962 So. 2d 1031, 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)). “The requirements of material harm and the lack of a remedy on appeal are jurisdictional.” Id. (quoting State v. Welch, 94 So. 3d 631, 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). “Certiorari is the appropriate method to review [an] order entered in connection with discovery proceedings.” Fortune Ins.

Co. v. Santelli, 621 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

Where the trial court’s denial of a motion for protective order grants discovery, that decision is reviewable through certiorari. Greenstein v. Baxas Howell Mobley, Inc., 583 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

We have jurisdiction. Next, we consider whether the trial court’s order departed from the essential requirements of the law. It is well-settled that an unretained expert cannot be compelled to render an expert opinion where he lacks knowledge of the facts of the case. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Coralluzzo, 499 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Young v. Metro. Dade Cty., 201 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).

A court errs in compelling an expert “to testify when he ha[s] not been retained by the part[ies] and ha[s] no specific knowledge of the case, in contrast to general knowledge [he] may have by virtue of being an expert.” Kridos v. Vinskus, 483 So. 2d 727, 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (on rehearing).

Moreover, a County employee cannot testify as an expert without the County’s explicit authorization. See §§ 2-11(a), (c), Miami-Dade Cty. Code of Ordinances. The parties did not retain Mr. Gascon as an expert and the County has not agreed to permit Mr. Gascon to testify.

Therefore, Mr. Gascon cannot testify as an expert witness. Although Respondents listed Mr. Gascon as an expert witness, they argue to this Court that he is actually a fact witness despite having “specialized knowledge

obtained through his work experience.”³ Respondents contend Mr. Gascon would be testifying to “statements of fact on when and how permits for roofing and skylights are applied for and obtained in Miami-Dade County.” Based on that, it is evident that Respondents seek to elicit expert testimony of County procedure. On the record before us, it is clear that Mr. Gascon does not have any personal knowledge of the subject warehouse or related permitting. Thus, Mr. Gascon is not qualified to testify as a fact witness under section 90.701, Florida Statutes (2019).

Mr. Gascon was not a retained expert, had not been authorized by the County to testify, and did not possess any personal knowledge of the underlying proceedings. As such, the County demonstrated good cause for issuance of a protective order. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c); Office of Att’y Gen. v. Millennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc., 800 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (citing Medina v. Yoder Auto Sales, Inc., 743 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)). In allowing Respondents to elicit testimony from Mr. Gascon under these circumstances, the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law resulting in material injury irremediable on plenary appeal.

Petition granted and order quashed.