ANAMARIE KELLY STOPPA
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
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The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order removing neglected or mistreated animals from an unfit owner under Florida's animal welfare statute. The case addresses the authority to remove animals from unsuitable owners and the permanence of injunctive relief in such proceedings.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order removing the animals, finding the owner unfit and unable to adequately provide for the animals as prescribed by § 828.073. The court confirmed that injunctions in such matters remain subject to modification if circumstances change and the court's decree reserves such right.
“providing for removal of neglected or mistreated animals from unfit owners by "the county court, any law enforcement officer, . . . or any agent of any county or of any society or association for the prevention of cruelty to animals"”
Establishes the statutory basis for animal removal authority under § 828.073(1)(b)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court determined that the defendant owner was unfit and unable to adequately provide for animals under Florida Statute § 828.073. The court …
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PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See § 828.073(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2023) (providing for removal of neglected or mistreated animals from unfit owners by “the county court, any law enforcement officer, . . . or any agent of any county or of any society or association for the prevention of cruelty to animals”); Brinkley v. County of Flagler, 769 So. 2d 468, 470, 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (affirming trial court’s order upholding section 828.073 as constitutional, finding owners were “unfit and unable to adequately provide for the animals as proscribed by section 828.073[,] and order[ing] that the animals be turned over . . . for appropriate placement and disposition”); see also Helwig v. Bugby o/b/o S.J.H., 306 So. 3d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“The ‘permanence’ of such injunctions is not that [a party] has forever lost his [or her] right[s] . . . but rather a prohibition until a further order of the court modifies or disposes of the injunction.”); Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 7 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 1942) (en banc) (“There is no doubt but that the court which renders a decree for a permanent or perpetual injunction may open or modify the same where the circumstances, and circumstances of the parties, are shown to have so changed as to make it just and equitable to do so, and especially where the decree itself reserves the right.”).
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- Brinkley v. Cnty. OF Flagler, 769 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- MJR Minton, LLC v. Long Doggers Eateries, 251 So. 3d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)