ERHARD BREITZ, APPELLANT,
v.
LYKES-PASCO PACKING CO., APPELLEE
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Breitz sued Lykes-Pasco Packing Co. for fraud, claiming the defendant overstated a debt. The trial court granted summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, finding the fraud claim was barred because the limitations period began running when Breitz had notice of the alleged injury and the transaction, which occurred more than four years before the lawsuit was filed.
The statute of limitations period for fraud begins running when the plaintiff has notice of the possible invasion of his legal rights and of the transaction involving the defendant resulting in the injury. The plaintiff need not know all elements of the fraud cause of action, specifically the element of fraudulent intent, for the limitations period to begin running.
[1] The statute of limitations for fraud begins to run when a plaintiff has notice of the alleged injury and the transaction resulting in the injury.
[2] Notice of the possible invasion of legal rights is sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations for fraud.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the limitations period began to run when plaintiff had notice of the alleged injury and of the transaction involving defendant resulting in the injury”
Establishes the standard for when the fraud statute of limitations begins to run
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBreitz brought suit against Lykes-Pasco Packing Co. for fraud, alleging that the defendant had fraudulently overstated a debt. Undisputed evidence sho…
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LEHAN, Judge.
We affirm the summary judgment for defendant based upon the running of the statute of limitations on the count of this suit for fraud.* Contrary to the arguments of plaintiff, the limitations period began to run when plaintiff had notice of the alleged injury and of the transaction involving defendant resulting in the injury. Cf. Jackson v. Georgopolous, 552 So. 2d 215, 218 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (Lehan, J., concurring). Cf. also Jackson v. Georgopolous, 552 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). That type of notice existed at a time more than four years prior to the filing of suit as shown by the undisputed evidence of plaintiffs expressed belief at that time that the debt claimed by plaintiff in this suit to have been fraudulently overstated by defendant was overstated by defendant.
The running of the limitations period began under these circumstances when plaintiff had “notice of the possible invasion of [his] legal rights.” Id. at 218 (Lehan, J., concurring), quoting Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 34 (Fla.1976). For this purpose it was not necessary that plaintiff know of all elements of his alleged cause of action, specifically in this case the element of fraudulent intent on the part of defendant. Id.; Armbrister v. Roland Int’l Corp., 667 F.Supp. 802, 812 (M.D.Fla.1987) (running of fraud statute of limitations begins when plaintiff should have known, with the exercise of any diligence, that the allegedly fraudulent transaction was suspect).
Affirmed.
CAMPBELL, C.J., and FRANK, J., concur. *
While there were other counts to which the summary judgment applied, the fraud count is the only count as to which plaintiff contends on appeal the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Hynd v. Ireland, 582 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…Appellant argues that a suit filed in June or July of 1984 would have been premature because the key element of damages was uncertain at that time. Further, appellant distinguishes a case relied upon by appel-lee, Breitz v. Lykes-Pasco Packing Co., 561 So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA) (the running of the statute of limitations began when plaintiff had “notice of the possible invasion of [his] legal rights [and] ... [f]or this purpose it was not necessary that plaintiff know of all elements of his alleged cause…
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W. Brook Isles P'r's 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 163 So. 3d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…statutes of limitations began to run. The statute of limitations for fraud begins to run when the plaintiff should have discovered, exercising any diligence, that the allegedly fraudulent transaction was suspect. Breitz v. Lykes-Pasco Packing Co., 561 So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Fraudulent concealment is markedly distinct; it focuses on subsequent actions to keep the improper conduct shrouded from sight. “Generally, two elements are required before the equitable principle of fraudulent concealment…
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Moji Props., Inc. v. Castro AND Castro, 616 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Breitz v. Lykes-Pasco Packing Co., 561 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 576 So. 2d 285 (Fla.1990); Codding v. Phillips, 296 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 304 So. 2d 125 (Fla.1974).…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976)
- Armbrister v. Roland Int'l Corp., 667 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Fla. 1987)
- Jackson v. George A. Georgopolous, M.D., 552 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)