AUBREY SHOEMAKE, APPELLANT,
v.
ALLIED BANK OF TEXAS, F/K/A ALLIED CHAMPIONS BANK, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Aubrey Shoemake appealed a summary judgment against him for breach of a promissory note and checking agreement. The appellate court reversed the judgment on the promissory note claim because the bank filed suit outside Texas's four-year statute of limitations for debt, but affirmed the judgment on the checking agreement claim where the statute of limitations did not apply.
The court reversed the summary judgment on Count I (the promissory note) because the bank's claim was barred by Texas's four-year statute of limitations for debt actions. The court affirmed the judgment on Count II (the checking agreement) because the statute of limitations did not apply to that claim. The court also struck any reference to Linda Shoemake's liability since she was never made a party to the action.
[1] A trial court errs in striking a defendant's affirmative defense of the statute of limitations when the defense is properly raised and applicable to the cause of action.
[2] The Texas four-year statute of limitations applies to actions for debt arising from a promissory note.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The promissory note was executed in Texas on November 7, 1983. The defaulted payment on the note due in Texas occurred on February 6, 1984. Appellee did not file this action until April 11, 1988.”
Establishes the timeline showing the claim was filed outside the four-year statute of limitations period under Texas law.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShoemake executed a promissory note in Texas on November 7, 1983, with a defaulted payment due on February 6, 1984. Allied Bank did not file suit unti…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Affirmative Defense cases and more on FLexlaw
CAMPBELL, Chief Judge.
Appellant, Aubrey Shoemake, challenges a final summary judgment which found in favor of appellee, Allied Bank of Texas, in its action seeking damages from appellant for failure to pay amounts due on a promissory note in Count I and for breach of contract on a checking agreement in Count II. The final summary judgment awarded appellee monetary damages, interest, attorney’s fees and costs on Count I in the amount of $32,015.13, and monetary damages and accrued interest on Count II in the amount of $7,985.64. Appellant pled the affirmative defense of the Texas statute of limitations of four years for actions for debt for both counts. § 16.004, Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code (1983). The causes of action clearly arose in the state of Texas where the parties resided.
We reverse the judgment in regard to Count I. The promissory note was executed in Texas on November 7, 1983. The defaulted payment on the note due in Texas occurred on February 6, 1984. Appellee did not file this action until April 11, 1988. The trial court, therefore, erred in striking appellant’s affirmative defense of the statute of limitations as to Count I and in entering summary judgment thereon for appellee. We, therefore, reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment for appellant as to Count I based on appellant’s affirmative defense of the Texas statute of limitations.
Concerning Count II which alleged amounts owing in regard to an overdraft check protection agreement, the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations is not applicable and we, therefore, affirm the judgment as it relates to Count II.
We do, however, strike the reference in the judgment to any liability of Linda Shoemake as she has never been made a party to this action and, therefore, is not properly made an obligor on the judgment.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part and remanded with instructions.
RYDER and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.