MICHAEL G. LANE

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed November 26, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D25-0712 Lower Tribunal No. F19-11445B

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Michael G. Lane,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Florida,

Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Richard Hersch, Judge. Michael G. Lane, in proper person. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Yolande M. Samerson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and MILLER, JJ. EMAS, J. Michael G. Lane appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to correct jail credit, purportedly pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801. However, Lane’s motion did not actually seek additional jail credit (i.e., credit for time spent in a county jail before sentencing), but instead sought credit for gain time, awarded by the Florida Department of Corrections while Lane was serving the prison portion of his split sentence. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion. Lane’s motion contains the following relevant allegations, which we accept as true for purposes of this appeal: ● Lane was arrested in July of 2019 in case number F19-11445B, and remained in the Dade County Jail until August 16, 2021. ● On that date, the trial court imposed a split sentence of four years’ state prison followed by three years’ reporting probation. The trial court awarded all credit for time served in the county jail prior to sentencing. ● While serving his four-year prison sentence, Lane was awarded 150 days gain time by the Florida Department of Corrections. ● Lane was released from prison and began serving the probationary portion of his split sentence. ● On May 2, 2024, while on probation, Lane was arrested and charged in three separate felony cases. He was also charged with violating his probation by committing the new felony offenses. ● On December 3, 2024, Lane entered a negotiated global plea to all four cases. As to his original case (F19-11445B), the trial court revoked Lane’s probation and sentenced Lane to 103.725 months in prison, with credit for all jail time and prison time previously served. On March 17, 2025, Lane filed the instant motion for correction of jail credit in his original felony case (F19-11445B). In that motion, Lane acknowledges he was awarded the correct amount of credit for time spent in the county jail, and that he was also awarded the correct amount of credit for time actually served in prison. For these reasons alone it is evident the trial court correctly denied his motion to correct jail credit under rule 3.801(a), given Lane’s candid concession that the jail credit awarded was not in need of correction. After all, as rule 3.801(a) provides: A court may correct a final sentence that fails to allow a defendant credit for all of the time he or she spent in the county jail before sentencing as provided in section 921.161, Florida Statutes. (Emphasis added). As the Florida Supreme Court has held: [G]ain time is no longer to be considered as time served for all purposes. While the award of gain time reduces an inmate's release date, just as actual time spent incarcerated, it is clearly not synonymous with actual time served. On the contrary, gain time is time not served. It is merely an incentive device used by the Department for purposes of encouraging good behavior both in prison and on supervision. Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 2000). Lane contends however, that he is entitled to continue receiving credit for 150 days of prison gain time awarded by the Florida Department of Corrections during the period he served his original four-year prison term. While this is beyond the scope and purpose of rule 3.801, we write to address the application and subsequent forfeiture of prison gain time in the context of a split sentence.

As indicated earlier, Lane was properly awarded credit for each day he actually served in the county jail (awaiting his original sentence and awaiting his subsequent sentence following the violation of his probation) and for each day he actually served in prison on the incarcerative portion of his original split sentence.

In addition, Lane correctly notes that, in the sentencing order following the revocation of his probation, the trial court indicated Lane was to receive credit for “all prior prison and gain time.” (Emphasis added). It is the above language that Lane relies upon for his motion, alleging that after returning to prison to begin serving his new sentence (103.725 months) the Florida Department of Corrections forfeited his accrued prison gain time of 150 days. However, the above language in the sentencing order is not determinative of whether Lane’s accrued prison gain time will be retained or forfeited.

When a split-sentenced prisoner is released from prison and remains under supervision (e.g., probation), is thereafter found to have violated that probation, and the trial court revokes probation and imposes a subsequent prison sentence, the trial court may “recommend” that a defendant’s accrued prison gain time not be forfeited. However, the statutory authority to declare a forfeiture of accrued prison gain time does not reside in the trial court. Since October¹, 1989, such authority has resided exclusively with the Florida Department of Corrections, even if the trial court recommends that such gain time be retained. Moore v. Pearson, 789 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. 2001) (“The authority to regulate gain time resides exclusively within the Department of Corrections pursuant to chapter 944, Florida Statutes.”); Eldridge, 760 So. 2d at 890-91. The Legislature conferred this exclusive authority on the Florida Department of Corrections by enacting section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (2024). The relevant statutory language has remained virtually identical since its 1989 adoption, and provides in pertinent part: If . . . probation or community control as described in chapter 948, . . . granted to the prisoner is revoked, the department may, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned according to the provisions of law by such prisoner prior to. . . his or her release under such . . . probation, community control, provisional release, control release, or parole. See also § 948.06(7), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever probation, community control, or control release, including the probationary, community control portion of a split sentence, is violated and the probation or community control is revoked, the offender, by reason of his or her misconduct, shall be deemed to have forfeited all gaintime or commutation of time for good conduct, as provided by law, earned up to the date of his or her release on probation, community control, or control release. This subsection does not deprive the prisoner of his or her right to gain-time or commutation of time for good conduct, as provided by law, from the date on which the prisoner is returned to prison.”). Notwithstanding the recommendation contained in the trial court’s written sentence, the Florida Department of Corrections determined that Lane’s accrued prison gain time should be forfeited upon his return to prison to serve a term of incarceration following revocation of his probation. The trial court correctly denied Lane’s motion to correct jail credit.¹ Affirmed.