BRIAN RIGOL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because the co-defendant's consent to search was knowing, voluntary, and valid.
Appellant was convicted of burglary, grand theft, and violation of probation. He moved to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fourth Amendment (Implied) cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Brian Rigol, appeals his conviction for burglary, grand theft, and violation of probation. We affirm.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a warrantless search of an apartment he shared with another person, the co-defendant in this case. Appellee, State, asserts that the search of the apartment was conducted after obtaining consent from the other resident of the apartment, the co-defendant. The trial court specifically found that the consent given by appellant’s co-defendant was knowing and voluntary and therefore denied the motion to suppress.
At a hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officers testified that the co-defendant had given them a valid consent to search. The police officers further testified about the circumstances surrounding the consent to search. There was no evidence presented to contradict the police officer’s testimony.
Co-occupants may consent to a search of their premises. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). The issue of voluntariness, in a consent to search, is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Voluntariness of the consent to search must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, under ordinary circumstances. Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1980). The trial court’s findings on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness, and a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).
A review of the record reveals ample support for the trial court’s finding that the consent here, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, was freely and voluntarily given. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. V.C. and R.S., 600 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…he evidence and reasonable inference[s] and deductions in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Owen v. State, 560 So. 2d 207, 211 (Fla.), certiorari denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 152, 112 L.Ed.2d 118 (1990); Rigol v. State, 561 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); State v. Rizo, 463 So. 2d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Furthermore, “a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court[,]” Rigol v. State, 561 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), but “must…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973)
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1974)
- Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 1980)
- Hernan Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)