STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PANSY DELORES FOSTER, APPELLEE
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The state appeals a suppression order excluding incriminating statements Foster made during a booking process. The trial court suppressed the statements because Foster had made similar statements earlier at her residence, converting the booking into functional interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The appellate court reversed, holding that routine booking procedures do not constitute custodial interrogation and that spontaneous incriminating statements do not convert booking into interrogation.
Routine booking procedures do not constitute inherently coercive custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. Spontaneous incriminating statements made by a suspect during booking do not convert the booking process into interrogation, even if similar statements were made earlier at the residence.
[1] Routine booking questions designed to obtain basic identifying data do not constitute an interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.
[2] The gathering of biographical data for booking purposes is an administrative procedure and not an inherently coercive custodial interrogation unless unusual circumstances…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Unless there are unusual circumstances which do not appear from the record in this case, the routine gathering of biographical data for booking purposes cannot be characterized as an inherently coercive custodial interrogation.”
Establishes that routine booking is not custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDetective Bowers executed a search warrant at Foster's residence and discovered cocaine in her pocket. Foster made spontaneous statements asking Bower…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
The state appeals an order which suppresses certain spontaneous, incriminating statements made by Foster while she was being booked on various related drug charges. Foster was not given Miranda1 warnings until after the booking process was completed. The suppression order was predicated upon Foster’s having earlier made similar statements during the execution of a search warrant at her residence. The trial court found the earlier statements converted the booking process into an interrogation2 and that Miranda warnings were therefore required before the statements could be admitted. We disagree and reverse.
As part of the execution of the search warrant, a Detective Bowers searched Foster at the residence and discovered cocaine in her right front pocket. Foster began crying and asked Bowers not to show it to anyone. Bowers later booked Foster. During the booking process, Foster asked Bowers how much cocaine had been found in the house. Bowers responded that suspected cocaine had been found on her person, upstairs over a washing machine area, and in the kitchen. Foster stated she had known about the cocaine over the washing machine. Bowers asked Foster only the routine booking questions.
During the booking process, a suspect is asked approximately fifteen general questions which relate solely to identity. It is simply an administrative procedure. Unless there are unusual circumstances which do not appear from the record in this case, the routine gathering of biographical data for booking purposes cannot be characterized as an inherently coercive custodial interrogation. The questions posed do not relate to criminal activity, and they are not posed to elicit an incriminating response. U.S. v. Avery, 717 F. 2d 1020 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905, 104 S.Ct. 1683, 80 L.Ed.2d 157 (1984).
The protective nature of Miranda warnings concerns investigative interrogation. We do not think Miranda applies to questions designed to obtain basic identifying data as routinely occurs at bookings or arraignments. State v. McAdams, 559 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Esposito v. Adams, 700 F.Supp. 1470, 1479 (N.D.Ill.1988). Miranda warnings are not required outside the context of an inherently coercive custodial interrogation. Roberts v. U.S., 445 U.S. 552, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980).
While “interrogation” may encompass more than express questions and may include any words or actions by law enforcement officers that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,3 incriminating, spontaneous statements made by a person under arrest do not convert the booking process to coercive interrogation. To hold otherwise would require the state to protect an arrestee from herself because she has a loquacious tongue. We do not think Miranda requires the state to gag a suspect or close its ears.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. The suppression order states:
[Bjecause the Defendant had earlier made spontaneous statements at her residence to Det. Bowers, the routine booking procedure amounted to the functional equivalent of interrogation.
. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
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Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17 (Fla. 2009)…ting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 966 n. 17 (Fla.1992)); see also Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 659 (Fla.1995) (concluding that the defendant’s statement was voluntary and spontaneous and not elicited by any interrogation); State v. Foster, 562 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that spontaneous statements are not always the product of an interrogation); Rosher v. State, 319 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (“Spontaneous statements are admissible in evidence [when they] are not the produc…
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Holland v. State, 773 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 2000)…t. On appeal, the district court reversed, finding that the detective’s statement amounted to an interrogation which was not initiated by the defendant. See id. We find the facts of Zeigler distinguishable from the present case. In State v. Foster, 562 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), the Fifth District Court of Appeal made the following observations: The protective nature of Miranda warnings concerns investigative interrogation. We do not think Miranda applies to questions designed to obtain basic iden…
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Lewis v. State, 754 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…terrogation” questioning “normally attendant to arrest and custody,” ie., routine booking questions intended to elicit necessary biographical information. See Innis, [*900] 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682; Allred, 622 So. 2d at 987; State v. Foster, 562 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). “Incriminating response” refers to “any response— whether inculpatory or exculpatory — that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1682. In its order denying the motion to suppres…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980)
- Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (U.S. 1980)
- State v. McADAMS, 559 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- United States v. Ozzie Lee Avery, Jr., 717 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1983)
- Sankary v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 466 U.S. 905 (U.S. 1984)