CROCKER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, CROCKER CENTER ASSOCIATES, LTD., CROCKER CENTER ASSOCIATES, I, LTD., CROCKER CENTER ASSOCIATES, II, LTD., CROCKER CENTER ASSOCIATES, III, LTD., CROCKER & COMPANY AND WILLIAM J. CROCKER & SONS, INC., PETITIONERS,
v.
RONNY HORNSBY AND CAROL HORNSBY, RESPONDENTS

Fla. 4th DCA | 1990-06-13
No. 90-0599
DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
562 So. 2d 842 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Crocker Construction Company sought to quash a trial court's discovery order requiring disclosure of financial information about the Crocker Center project. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the discovery order, finding no fundamental error and holding that ownership information was relevant to whether an owner-builder could claim workers' compensation immunity.


Holding

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. The discovery order did not constitute fundamental error because the ownership information was relevant to the central issue of whether an owner-builder could claim workers' compensation immunity, and the trial court could fashion appropriate safeguards to protect any truly confidential trade secrets.


Headnotes

[1] Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is seldom granted to quash interlocutory orders absent a showing of fundamental error and irreparable injury.

[2] A party seeking certiorari to quash a discovery order must demonstrate that the order departs from the essential requirements of law and that compliance would cause irrep…

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Key Quotes

“Certiorari is seldom granted to quash interlocutory orders of the trial courts absent a showing of fundamental error.”

Establishes the high threshold petitioner must meet to overturn a discovery order via certiorari

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Facts & Procedural History

Crocker Construction Company and related entities were defendants in a case brought by the Hornsbys. The trial court ordered discovery of financial in…

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Opinion of the Court
POLEN, Judge.

POLEN, Judge.

Crocker Construction Company timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking to quash the trial court's interlocutory order compelling discovery of certain financial information. The information sought would relate to financing, ownership, development, and construction of the project known as Crocker Center during the years 1984, 1985, and 1986. The issue of ownership is relevant to respondents’ position that, while a general contractor may be immune from tort liability under the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation law, section 440.10, Florida Statutes (1985), an owner-builder may not be so immune. Respondents further argued to the trial court that the non-party entities from which financial discovery was sought were in effect alter egos of Crocker Construction Company. While respondents’ pleadings at the time did not contain allegations of alter-ego theory as would be required under Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla.1984), it was respondents’ position that the information sought would lead to admissible evidence of alter ego, and would form the basis of a motion to amend the pleadings.

While petitioner did not assert any work product or attorney-client type privilege as to the information sought, it argued to the trial court that similar requests for financial records had previously been denied in the case, and that some of the records sought as to non-parties constituted confidential, classified information and/or trade secrets. The trial court overruled petition er’s objections and ordered the discovery produced. For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition for writ of certiorari.

Certiorari is seldom granted to quash interlocutory orders of the trial courts absent a showing of fundamental error. Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla.1987). Petitioner in this case must establish not only that the trial court’s discovery order departs from the essential requirements of the law, but also that compliance with such order would constitute irreparable injury which could not be remedied on a plenary appeal. On the other hand, certiorari is occasionally granted where the above requirements are met and petitioner is seeking to avoid disclosure of “cat-out-of-the-bag” type information. From the record before us, we do not find that the discovery from which petitioner seeks protection would fall into that category. As to any alleged confidential or classified trade secrets of the petitioner or the non-parties, the trial court, upon appropriate motion, can easily fashion safeguards to prevent dissemination of this information to other entities which are not involved in the litigation. As previously noted, the issue of ownership of the property, or potential alter-ego ownership, is relevant to the central issue in the case.

Finally, we must address respondents’ motion to supplement the appendix. Apparently, respondents wish to place before this court a proposed (or perhaps now filed) amended complaint addressing the alter-ego issue. In light of our determination to deny certiorari, we deem this request to be moot. This is with the understanding, of course, that before respondents could proceed to trial on any alter-ego theory, there must be a proper complaint before the court alleging such a factual scenario. Dania Jai-Alai.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the respondents’ motion to supplement the index is denied.

DOWNEY and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.


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Cited By

  • Trepal v. State, 754 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2000)
    …ent proceedings for which the remedy by appeal will be inadequate. Id. at 157 (where the court reviewed by certiorari a trial court’s denial of a party’s discovery request in light of the work-product privilege); see Crocker Constr. Co. v. Hornsby, 562 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)(stating that certiorari relief may be granted to avoid harmful “cat-out-of-the-bag” disclosures). This Court, however, does not have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for common law certiorari. We therefore must rely on o…
  • Tucker v. Resha, 610 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …t of common-law certiorari like the one requested herein. See Rule 9.030(b)(3). Absent a showing of fundamental error or “exceptional circumstances,” certiorari is seldom granted to quash an interlocutory order. Crocker Construction Co. v. Hornsby, 562 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Boucher; Vanco Constr. Co. v. Nucor Corp., 378 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The Florida Supreme Court has ruled that a non-final order, like the present one not reviewable under Rule 9.130, is subject to review “only in limit…
  • Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Jerrold Ross, 778 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
    …f the petitioner or the non-parties, the trial court, upon appropriate motion, can easily fashion safeguards to prevent dissemination of this information to other entities which are not involved in the litigation. See Crocker Constr. Co. v. Hornsby, 562 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Petitioner claims the production ordered by the trial court is irrelevant. To the extent this may be true, we lack jurisdiction as the production of irrelevant material does not rise to the level of irreparable harm for certio…

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