CITY OF MIAMI, APPELLANT,
v.
BOBBY BARCLAY, APPELLEE
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The City of Miami appeals the trial court's order requiring return of a seized Jeep, claiming the vehicle is contraband subject to forfeiture under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act even though the state abandoned prosecution. The appellate court reverses, holding that forfeiture proceedings are independent civil matters and that the defendant's motion for return was premature because only 17 days had elapsed of the 90-day period within which forfeiture proceedings must be initiated.
The vehicle need not be returned and the trial court's order requiring its return was reversed. The forfeiture process is civil in nature independent of criminal prosecution, and a defendant is not entitled to have his vehicle returned during the pendency of forfeiture proceedings. The defendant's motion was premature because forfeiture proceedings were timely initiated within the 90-day statutory period.
[1] A vehicle is considered contraband under Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act if it has been or is employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abe…
[2] An action to recover seized property may be maintained if forfeiture proceedings are not initiated within 90 days after the date of seizure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Neither replevin nor any other action to recover any interest in such property shall be maintained in any court, except as provided in this act; however, such action may be maintained if forfeiture proceedings are not initiated within 90 days after the date of seizure.”
Establishes the statutory framework governing when property may be recovered and the critical 90-day deadline for initiating forfeiture proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 22, 1989, police arrested Bobby Barclay following a chase in his 1984 Jeep Cherokee for armed robbery and driving with a suspended licens…
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NESBITT, Judge.
The City of Miami seeks reversal of an order requiring the return of personal property seized pursuant to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (§§ 932.701-932.704, Fla.Stat. (1989)).
On September 22, 1989, subsequent to a police chase in which appellee was driving his 1984 Jeep Cherokee, appellee was arrested for armed robbery and driving with a suspended license. Shortly thereafter, the state abandoned appellee’s prosecution and declared a “no action.” Appellee immediately moved for the return of his jeep claiming that, in light of the state’s decision not to file formal charges, the jeep was not contraband within the meaning of the forfeiture statute. Based on section 932.703(1), Florida Statutes (1989), the city argued against appellee's motion. The trial court ruled in appellee’s favor and ordered the jeep returned.
A “contraband article,” under Florida’s Contraband Forfeiture Act, includes “any personal property including, but not limited to, any ... weapon ... [or] vehicle of any kind ... which has been or is actually employed as an instrumentality in the commission of, or in aiding or abetting the commission of, any felony.” § 932.701(2)(e), Fla.Stat. (1989).
Section 932.703(1), Florida Statutes (1989) clearly provides that “Neither replevin nor any other action to recover any interest in such property shall be maintained in any court, except as provided in this act; however, such action may be maintained if forfeiture proceedings are not initiated within 90 days after the date of seizure.” See Lamar v. Universal Supply Co., 479 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1985); see also City of Pompano Beach v. General Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., 493 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
The state contends and the officers’ arrest report substantiates that the officers in the instant case had probable cause to stop and arrest the defendant and seize the jeep. See Gillum v. One 1978 Kenworth Semi-Truck Tractor, VIN 260963J, FLA License BTZ 516R, 543 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); see also Diaz v. State, 548 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
Forfeiture proceedings were initiated on December 15, 1989, within the ninety-day period. The forfeiture process is civil in nature, and neither conviction nor acquittal in the companion criminal case is determinative of the forfeiture proceeding. In re Alcoholic Beverages Seized from Saul’s Elk Club on June 30, 1982, 440 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Further, a defendant is not entitled to have his vehicle returned during the pendency of the forfeiture proceeding. McLane v. Youngblood, 544 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) citing Pompano. Beach v. General Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., 493 So. 2d at 97.
Therefore, because only seventeen days had passed when defendant moved to have his jeep returned, his action was premature. Accordingly, we reverse the order entered by the lower court requiring that the city return the jeep to the defendant.
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Kern v. State, 706 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…of the issues in the forfeiture proceeding. In fact, neither the record nor the judgment in the criminal case is admissible in the civil action seeking in rem forfeiture. State v. DuBose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477 (1943); City of Miami v. Barclay, 563 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Knight v. State, 336 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 424 (Fla.1977). The “post-acquittal” procedure used in this case does not provide the constitutional safeguards required for forfeiture. See Dept. of…
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Fink v. Holt, 609 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…ed by the rules. See e.g., Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla.1991); Smith v. Hindery, 454 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); City of St. Petersburg v. Jewell, 489 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); City of Miami v. Barclay, 563 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Wille v. Karrh, 423 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); and Medious v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 534 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1333 (Fla.1989). We have therefore amended the captio…
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City OF Coral Gables v. Rodriguez, 568 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…ure.” ■ The City’s forfeiture proceeding was pending at the time the court ordered the return of the property. “[A] defendant is not entitled to have his vehicle returned during the pendency of the forfeiture proceeding.” City of Miami v. Barclay, 563 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); McLane v. Youngblood, 544 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); see Lamar v. Universal Supply Co., 479 So. 2d 109 (Fla.1985); City of Pompano Beach v. General Mobile Home Brokers, 493 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Consequently, R…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lawson L. Lamar v. Universal Supply Co., Inc., 479 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1985)
- In re Forfeiture of the following described Prop.: Alcoholic Beverages Seized From Saul's Elks Club ON June 30 v. Cobb, 440 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Laux v. Forrest E. Laux, 543 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Diaz v. State, 548 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- City OF Pompano Beach v. Gen. Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., 493 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- McLANE v. Harmon Youngblood, 544 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Mains v. State, 544 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)