JOHNSON ENGINEERING, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
J. FOSTER PATE, AS TRUSTEE, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Johnson Engineering sought a writ of certiorari to challenge a trial court's denial of its request for a jury trial as untimely. The Florida District Court of Appeal held that when an amended pleading injects new issues into a case, the time for demanding a jury trial is revived, and the trial court's denial departed from the essential requirements of law.
The court held that when an amended pleading injects new issues into a case, the time for filing a demand for a jury trial is revived, even if the party waived the right at the time of initial responsive pleadings. The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by denying the timely jury trial demand.
[1] A writ of certiorari may be used to review an order denying a request for a jury trial.
[2] A party's right to demand a jury trial is revived when an amended pleading injects new issues into the case.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where an amended pleading injects a new issue in the case the time for filing a demand for a jury trial is revived although the party making the demand may have waived the right to a jury trial at the time of the initial responsive pleadings.”
Establishes the foundational legal rule that revives jury trial demand rights upon amended pleadings with new issues.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn August 1989, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner. Petitioner answered by denying allegations. In January 1990, respondent noticed the c…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Amended Pleadings cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to quash an order that denied, as untimely, its request for a jury trial. We have jurisdiction. Quality Coffee Service, Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 474 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Magram v. Raffel, 443 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Alderman, 238 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). But see Tucker v. Rudnianyn, 517 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Lindsey v. Sherman, 402 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (both holding that certiorari does not lie to review orders denying demand for jury trial). Cf. State, Department of Natural Resources v. Estech, Inc., 515 So. 2d 758, 759 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (suggesting that either mandamus or certiorari is appropriate vehicle to challenge such order).
In August 1989 the respondent filed a complaint against petitioner. The petitioner answered the complaint by essentially denying all allegations. On January 24, 1990, the respondent noticed the case for nonjury trial. On March 1, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion to amend its answer to include affirmative defenses and a request for jury trial.
At the April 2, 1990, hearing on the motion to amend, counsel for the respondent objected to the petitioner’s demand for jury trial on the basis that it would “substantially delay” the proceedings. Counsel for the petitioner explained to the trial court that the delay in the request for a jury trial was occasioned by a clerical error and subsequent discovery revealed that the case was more complex than initially assessed and involved issues best tried by a jury. Counsel further argued that there would be no undue delay in the matter because it had been at issue for less than six months and had not been set for trial. The trial court granted the petitioner’s motion to amend its answer to raise the affirmative defenses, but denied its demand for a jury trial on the basis that the request was untimely.
In Hollywood, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65 (Fla.1975), the supreme court held that “[wjhere an amended pleading injects a new issue in the case the time for filing a demand for a jury trial is revived although the party making the demand may have waived the right to a jury trial at the time of the initial responsive pleadings.” Id. at 72. In that case the supreme court quashed an order which denied the respondent’s timely demand for a jury trial filed after its amended answer and cross-claims were filed. See also Quality Coffee Service, Inc.. (quashing a similar order). Cf. Southeast Aluminum Supply Corp. v. Plastics North American, Inc., 413 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (trial court did not abuse discretion in denying demand for jury trial where leave to file amended pleading was conditioned on trial not being delayed by request for jury trial).
Based upon these authorities, we conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in denying the petitioner’s demand for jury trial, embodied in its amended answer, that raised new issues which are triable by a jury. Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the trial court’s order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LEHAN, A.C.J., and PARKER and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc, 720 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1998)…WELLS, Justice. We have for review Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 698 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), which certified conflict with Johnson Engineering, Inc. v. Pate, 563 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Quality Coffee Service, Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 474 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); and Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc., 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. T…
-
AIG Life Ins. Co. v. Boroughf, 588 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…CURIAM. Denied. Lindsey v. Sherman, 402 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Accord Fenner v. Jack L. Butcher, Inc., 560 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Tucker v. Rudnianyn, 517 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Contra Johnson Engineering, Inc. v. Pate, 563 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Quality Coffee Service, Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 474 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc., 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Alderman, 238 So. 2d…
-
Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 698 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…r striking Petitioner’s demand for jury trial. See Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire, 670 So. 2d 153, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Lindsey v. Sherman, 402 So. 2d 1349, 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We also certify conflict with Johnson Engineering, Inc. v. Pate, 563 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Quality Coffee Service, Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 474 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), and Spring v. Ronel Refining, Inc., 421 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). STONE, C.J., and PARIENTE and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hollywood, Inc. v. City OF Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1975)
- Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth. v. Alderman, 238 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Lindsey v. Sherman, 402 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Quality Coffee Serv., Inc. v. Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 474 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Garcia v. State, 443 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Isadore H. Magram and Magram Motor Cars v. Blair A. Raffel and Allan R. Knight, 443 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Se. Aluminum Supply Corp. v. Plastics N. Am., Inc., 413 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- State v. Estech, Inc., 515 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- Tucker v. Rudnianyn, 517 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Grover v. State, 517 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)