CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
KRISTEN A. WILKERSON, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS, DAVID JOHN WILKERSON AND LYNN WINTERS WILKERSON, AND DAVID JOHN WILKERSON AND LYNN WINTERS WILKERSON, HIS WIFE, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLEES
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Continental Casualty Company sought to reform an insurance policy to delete uninsured motorist coverage allegedly included by mutual mistake. The trial court entered summary judgment against the insurer, but the appellate court reversed, finding genuine disputes of fact precluding summary judgment on whether both parties mutually erred in including the uninsured motorist protection.
Summary judgment was improperly entered because genuine disputes of fact existed regarding whether there was mutual mistake in including uninsured motorist protection, and the unconscionability issue depends on undeveloped factual matters including detrimental reliance that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
[1] Summary judgment is improper when disputed issues of fact exist regarding mutual mistake in the formation of an insurance policy.
[2] Evidence presented by a party seeking summary judgment must conclusively refute the allegations of the opposing party's complaint.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There are disputed issues of fact as to whether there was a mutual mistake by the insured and insurer in the inclusion in the insurance policy of a form for uninsured motorist protection.”
Establishes the core factual dispute that precluded summary judgment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceContinental Casualty Company issued an insurance policy to the Wilkersons that included a form for uninsured motorist protection. The insurance compan…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the final summary judgment entered against appellant on its complaint for reformation of an insurance policy. There are disputed issues of fact as. to whether there was a mutual mistake by the insured and insurer in the inclusion in the insurance policy of a form for uninsured motorist protection. Suffice it to say that the evidence presented by appellee did not conclusively refute the allegations of appellant’s complaint in this regard, as appellee must do in order to be entitled to summary judgment. See Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla.1985). The deposition of the insurance company representative clearly states that inclusion of the uninsured motorist page in the policy was an error, and the depositions and affidavits in no way conclusively refute that this was not a mutual error. For instance the record contains the previous years’ insurance policies which show a specific designated charge for uninsured motorist coverage, whereas the subject year’s policy does not. Therefore, an inference may be drawn that the parties did not intend to include the U.M. coverage in the subject year’s policy by the lack of a specific charge therefore. Therefore, summary judgment was improperly entered.
The trial court also entered summary judgment on the alternate ground that it would be unconscionable and contrary to law to reform the insurance contract to delete coverage after an allegedly covered loss occurs. Both appellant and appellee recite legions of cases from across the country supporting their respective positions. It is not necessary, however, to decide this issue at this juncture, because whether or not the resulting reformation is unconscionable depends on factual matters, including detrimental reliance, which have not been developed yet in this record.
We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.
LETTS, WALDEN and WARNER, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1985)