FREDDY ANDRADE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Freddy Andrade appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, cocaine trafficking conspiracy, and resisting arrest. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed all convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges to the suppression of his statements, jury replacement, sentencing enhancements, jury instructions, prosecutorial comments, and evidentiary rulings.
The court affirmed all convictions and sentences, holding that: (1) Andrade waived his right to counsel and clearly waived his right to remain silent; his statements were voluntary and unrelated to prior abuse; (2) excusing a juror who was ill with the flu and replacing him with an alternate juror was proper; (3) the firearm evidence supported conviction enhancements and three-year mandatory minimum sentences, which could be imposed consecutively; (4) the abandonment instruction was properly denied due to lack of supporting evidence and deficiencies in the proposed instruction; (5) prosecutorial comments did not warrant mistrial; and (6) the codefendant's statement was properly excluded as it was not a declaration against penal interest.
[1] A defendant's incriminating statements to police are admissible when the defendant is clearly informed of their rights, waives them, and makes the statements voluntarily,…
[2] A juror's inability to attend trial due to illness justifies excusal and replacement with an alternate juror.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant at no time affirmatively asserted his desire to speak to a lawyer and clearly waived his right to counsel and his right to remain silent prior to any police interrogation in this case”
Establishes that Andrade's incriminating statements were admissible because he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAndrade was convicted of first-degree murder, three counts of attempted murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, and resisting arrest …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Waiver Of Right To Remain Silent cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendant Freddy Andrade from final judgments of conviction and sentences for (1) first-degree murder, (2) three counts of attempted murder, (3) armed robbery, (4) conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, and (5) resisting arrest with violence. We affirm based on the following briefly stated legal analysis.
First, the trial court did not, as urged, commit reversible error in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his incriminating statements to the police. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the defendant at no time affirmatively asserted his desire to speak to a lawyer and clearly waived his right to counsel and his right to remain silent prior to any police interrogation in this case. Moreover, the state established that the defendant’s incriminating statements were freely and voluntarily given and were unrelated to the physical and verbal abuse which the defendant previously received at the hands of the police officers from another police department who did not participate in the subject police interrogation. Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 417 So. 2d 329 (Fla.1982).
Second, the trial court did not, as urged, commit reversible error in excusing a juror during trial and in replacing the said juror with an alternate juror. The juror called the trial judge on the morning of the last day of the trial and reported that the juror was sick with the flu and would be unable to come to court; the trial judge excused the juror and thereafter replaced him with an alternate juror. We see no reversible error in this procedure. United States v. Houlihan, 332 F. 2d 8, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828, 85 S.Ct. 56, 13 L.Ed.2d 37 (1964); North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77, 79-80 (Fla.1952), aff'd, 346 U.S. 932, 74 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed. 423 (1954); Orosz v. State, 389 So. 2d 1199, 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State v. Tresvant, 359 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1375 (Fla.1979).
Third, the trial court did not, as urged, commit reversible error in enhancing the defendant’s conviction on the three counts of attempted murder and in imposing three-year mandatory minimum sentences as to each of these convictions; this is so because the evidence establishes that the defendant possessed a firearm during the criminal episode in question. Junco v. State, 510 So. 2d 909, 912-13 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 518 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.1987); Smith v. State, 438 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 888 (Fla.1984). Moreover, the facts of this case clearly permit the imposition of consecutive three-year mandatory minimum sentences. Le-Croy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 3262, 106 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989); State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.1986).
Finally, (a) the defendant’s requested jury instruction on the defense of abandonment was properly denied because there was no evidence adduced at trial to support such a defense and the proposed instruction was otherwise incomplete and misleading, Smith v. State, 424 So. 2d 726, 732 (Fla.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1145, 103 S.Ct. 3129, 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983); Taylor v. State, 350 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1221 (Fla.1978); (b) the prosecuting attorney’s complained-of comments during final argument to the jury did not call for a mistrial, Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133-34 (Fla.1985); Burr v. State, 466 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 879, 106 S.Ct. 201, 88 L.Ed.2d 170 (1985); Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 184, 74 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); Erwin v. State, 532 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1989); and (c) the trial court properly excluded the codefendant’s hearsay statement to a police officer as it was not, as urged, a declaration against penal interest. Maugeri v. State, 460 So. 2d 975, 977 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), dismissed, 469 So. 2d 749 (Fla.1985).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Connolly v. State, 172 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…progeny. . The State in Junco relied for its argument upon State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165 (Fla.1985), State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.1986), and Murray v. State, 491 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1986). . The majority also relies upon Andrade v. State, 564 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). In Andrade, the defendant was convicted of seven separate counts (three counts of attempted murder, and one count each of first-degree murder, armed robbery, conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, and resisting arrest with violence).…1 / 2
-
Gonzalez v. State, 569 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…87 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Knight v. State, 559 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Third-degree murder, a second-degree felony, may be enhanced to a first-degree felony if the defendant uses a firearm. See § 775.087(1)(b), Fla.Stat. Cf. Andrade v. State, 564 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); State v. Smith, 470 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), approved, 485 So. 2d 1284 (1986). However, the appellant argues that his use of the firearm was an essential element of the crime. The court gave the third-degree murder charge,…
-
McGAHEE v. State, 600 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…jury on the defense of excusable homicide by sudden and sufficient provocation. This is so because the defendant at no time relied on this defense in his presentation to the jury; his sole defense to the jury was self-defense. See Andrade v. State, 564 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), rev. denied, 576 So. 2d 284 (Fla.1991); Jefferson v. State, 471 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The final judgment of conviction and sentence for attempted manslaughter with a firearm is affirmed. The final judgment of…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (27 total)
- Tison v. Arizona (two cases), 459 U.S. 882 (U.S. 1982)
- Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1985)
- Coffman Realty, Inc. v. Tosohatchee Game Preserve, Inc., 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982)
- McArthur Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982)
- THE Florida BAR v. Merwin, 424 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1982)
- State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1986)
- North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1953)
- United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1964)
- Smith v. Florida, 462 U.S. 1145 (U.S. 1983)
- Thomas Organ Co. v. Neal, 379 U.S. 828 (U.S. 1964)