MICHAEL MAURICE MASSEY, PETITIONER,
v.
HON. GAYLE GRAZIANO, RESPONDENT
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Michael Massey petitioned for a writ of prohibition to be discharged from prosecution for three felony counts, claiming violation of his speedy trial rights. The Florida appellate court granted the writ, finding that the state failed to bring Massey to trial within the mandatory window period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(4), causing the trial court to lose jurisdiction.
Massey's speedy trial rights were violated. The state's failure to afford Massey a hearing and trial within the window period resulted in the trial court's loss of jurisdiction, requiring discharge from prosecution. The technical citation error in the motion did not defeat relief because the motion was clearly titled as a discharge motion and adequately stated its factual basis, and the state suffered no prejudice.
[1] A defendant is entitled to discharge from prosecution if the state fails to bring the defendant to trial within the five and ten day window period following the filing of…
[2] A trial court loses jurisdiction to conduct a trial on charges when the state fails to afford the defendant a hearing or trial within the statutory window period after a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under the current speedy trial rule, the duty rests on the state to afford a defendant a hearing, and, if necessary, a trial within the window period provided by rule 3.191(i)(4).”
Establishes that the state bears the primary duty to comply with speedy trial requirements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMassey filed a motion for discharge after the 175-day speedy trial period expired. The state did not seek a hearing within five days of the motion's f…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
Massey files a petition for writ of prohibition seeking discharge from prosecution for two counts of aggravated battery and one count of battery on a law enforcement officer. He claims his speedy trial rights under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 have been violated. We agree and issue the writ because the state failed to bring Massey to trial within the five and ten day window period afforded the state under rule 3.191(i)(4).1
The record establishes that Massey filed a motion for discharge following the expiration of the applicable 175 day speedy trial period provided by rule 3.191(a)(1). The State did not seek a hearing within five days from the date of the filing of the motion, nor did it seek a trial within the ten day period proceeding therefrom. At a subsequent hearing, held 21 days after the motion had been filed, the trial court refused to rule on Massey’s motion because the motion cited to the incorrect rule number (rule 3.190 rather than rule 3.191). The court explained this was why the clerk failed to timely bring the motion to the court’s attention.
However, Massey correctly titled his motion as one for discharge, and the body of his motion clearly indicated the factual basis for the relief sought. In addition, the state failed to allege any prejudice caused by the “deficiency” in the motion. Nor is any apparent on the face of the record.
Under the current speedy trial rule, the duty rests on the state to afford a defendant a hearing, and, if necessary, a trial within the window period provided by rule 3.191(i)(4). Ariza v. Cycmanick, 548 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Lenard v. Moxley, 497 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). The state’s failure to perform this duty results in the trial court’s loss of jurisdiction to conduct a trial on the charges. Ari-za. Accordingly, we issue the writ of prohibition and order that Massey be discharged from further prosecution for the three felony offenses involved in this cause.
WRIT GRANTED.
HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(4) is now renumbered rule 3.191(i)(3) effective July 1, 1989. See In re Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, 542 So. 2d 1330 (Fla.1989).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Baxter v. Brandt C. Downey, III, 581 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…out a ruling, regardless whether the motion for discharge was meritorious. This argument is grounded primarily in two recent decisions which describe as “jurisdictional” the duty to afford “a hearing and, if necessary, a trial.” Massey v. Graziano, 564 So. 2d 287 (Fla.5th DCA 1990); Ariza v. Cycmanick, 548 So. 2d 304 (Fla.5th DCA 1989). Neither opinion, however, details the findings made once the motions for discharge finally were heard (21 days later in Massey, 24 days in Ariza). No other “late hearing” cas…
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Wills v. The Honorable Thomas Wilson, 586 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…the motion be granted: If a trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of time established by this Rule, a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court_ [Emphasis added]. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(d)(3). Massey v. Graziano, 564 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Ariza v. Cycmanick, 548 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). In this case, the trial court struck the motion. The only provision in these rules which provide for the striking of a motion for discharge is where the motion is not time…
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State v. Martinez, 586 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…State v. Brown, 412 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Nevertheless the trial court dismissed the prosecution because the state had not brought the motion on for hearing within five days as required by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(i)(3). See Massey v. Graziano, 564 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Ariza v. Cycmanick, 548 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Lenard v. Moxley, 497 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). We disagree and reverse. It seems obvious that the failure to hold a hearing on a motion which, as a matter of [*128…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ariza v. Hon. Michael F. Cycmanick, 548 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- Lenard v. The Honorable John Dean Moxley, Jr., 497 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- In re Amendment TO Fla. Rule OF Crim. Procedure 3.191 (Speedy Trial), 542 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 1989)