BRUCE L. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Smith was stopped by police based on a radio message about a drug case, and officers later searched him and found cannabis. The court reversed Smith's conviction, holding that the stop was pretextual because the officers relied on the radio message rather than the traffic violation they cited, and the officer with actual probable cause was not present at the suppression hearing to testify.
The court reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was improper and the suppression motion should have been granted because the officers relied on Thames's radio message rather than the traffic violation, and Thames's absence from the hearing prevented the state from establishing a valid basis for the stop under Kehoe.
[1] A traffic stop is illegal if based solely on a radio dispatch from another officer without independent corroboration of the information provided in the dispatch.
[2] A police officer's testimony that they would have stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction regardless of other information does not validate an otherwise illegal stop i…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“rolling through the stop sign "did not make a difference" in regard to his decision to make the stop”
Establishes that the traffic violation was pretextual and the actual motivation for the stop was the radio message from Thames
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Locke stopped Smith's vehicle after receiving a radio message from Officer Thames that Thames had a drug case to make against a passenger in t…
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COBB, Judge.
We are once again confronted with a Kehoe1 issue. One police officer (Locke) stopped a vehicle upon receipt of radio information from another officer (Thames) that the latter had a drug case to make against a passenger in the car, the defendant, Smith. Locke testified at the suppression hearing, as did a fellow officer, Pederson — but Thames was not present at the hearing. Locke testified that he saw the vehicle “roll through a stop sign as it was making a right-hand turn.” He indicated he would have stopped the vehicle in any event because of the radio message from Thames, and candidly admitted that rolling through the stop sign “did not make a difference” in regard to his decision to make the stop. Neither Locke nor Peder-son testified that, absent the message from Thames, they would have stopped the vehicle for the traffic infraction. Cf. State v. Gibson and Riley, 560 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). No traffic charge was made against the driver. Smith was questioned by Thames, who arrived on the scene after the stop, and subsequently arrested and searched.
Neither Locke nor Pederson supplied any basis for the stop, other than the pretextual one. It is possible that Thames could have provided probable cause, but he was not at the hearing. Under Kehoe, we have no alternative but to reverse the conviction for possession of cannabis based upon the improper, and dispositive, denial of the suppression motion. See also, Monroe v. State, 543 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Porcher v. State, 538 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur. . Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988).
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Citator
Cited By
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Alton Brown v. State, 577 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…assess all the circumstances and evaluate whether a reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle. Kehoe at 1097. Here, several factors indicate a pretext, including the fact that Brown was not cited for a traffic violation. See Smith v. State, 564 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Whitfield v. State, 559 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Arnold v. State, 544 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Further, at the hearing, Officer Cuicci was unable to cite the ordinance and the state did not present evidence of such an…
Authorities Cited
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- Monroe v. State, 543 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- Porcher v. State, 538 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)
- State v. Gibson, 560 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)