ROBERT S. RICH, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
ARTHUR C. (TONY) GULLIVER, APPELLEE
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In this appeal from a bench trial, the plaintiff Rich sought specific performance of an oral contract to sell real property. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding the contract barred by the statute of frauds and unenforceable due to uncertain terms. The appellate court affirmed, upholding the dismissal and confirming the defendant's obligation to repay the $20,000 advance.
The trial court properly dismissed the specific performance action because the alleged contract was barred by the statute of frauds (not in writing) and its terms relating to payment and default were too uncertain to be specifically enforced. The trial court correctly ordered the defendant to repay the $20,000 advance from escrow proceeds, and was not required to impress an equitable lien or assess interest, though the plaintiff may pursue a money judgment if escrow proceeds are insufficient.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend a complaint when the amendment is untimely and the evidence supporting it would be barred by the…
[2] An oral contract for the sale of real property is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the terms of the alleged contract relating to payment and default were entirely uncertain and, accordingly, the contract could not be specifically enforced”
Establishes that uncertainty in contract terms precludes specific performance as a remedy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRich advanced $20,000 to Gulliver allegedly in connection with an oral contract for the sale of real property. The alleged contract terms relating to …
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff Robert S. Rich, Jr. from a final judgment entered upon an involuntary dismissal after a non-jury trial on a suit for specific performance of an oral contract to sell a parcel of real property. We affirm.
First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint because (a) the proposed amendment was made at the outset of the trial below and was entirely untimely, and (b) the evidence in support of the proposed amendment was, in any event, adduced at trial, and such evidence clearly established that the cause of action pled therein was barred by the statute of frauds. See Winfield v. Noe, 426 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Chitty & Co. v. Preston H. Haskell Co., 423 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); International Patrol & Detective Agency, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 396 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), approved, 419 So. 2d 323 (Fla.1982); Brown v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), cert. denied, 257 So. 2d 561 (Fla.1972).
Second, the trial court did not err in granting an involuntary dismissal on the plaintiff’s specific performance count because (a) the terms of the alleged contract relating to payment and default were entirely uncertain and, accordingly, the contract could not be specifically enforced, see Womack v. Madison Drug Co., 155 Fla. 335, 20 So. 2d 256 (1945); LaMar v. Lechlider, 135 Fla. 703, 185 So. 833 (1939); Fox v. Sails at Laguna Club Dev. Corp., 403 So. 2d 456, 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); and (b) the alleged contract was never reduced to writing and was barred by the statute of frauds. See Dorsey v. Behm, 356 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); De Lucca v. Flamingo Corp., 121 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); § 689.01, Fla.Stat. (1989); see also Segovia Inv., Inc. v. Katogas, 364 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
Third, the trial court properly ordered the defendant Arthur C. Gulliver to repay the plaintiff the $20,000 advanced by the plaintiff to Gulliver, and, was not required, as urged, to impress an equitable lien on the subject property in the plaintiff’s favor or to assess any interest thereon. In the event, however, that the plaintiff is unable to obtain the $20,000 from the proceeds of the escrow account, as ordered in the final judgment, the plaintiff is clearly entitled to obtain a money judgment in the aforesaid amount against the defendant in the trial court. See Price v. Price, 17 Fla. 605 (1888); 22 Fla.Jur.2d Equity § 42 (1980); cf. Janeczek v. Embry, 330 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Neveils v. Thagard, 145 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962).
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited (17 total)
- Holmes La Mar v. Lechlider, 135 Fla. 703 (Fla. 1939)
- Brown v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Emilio FOX and Frances Fox v. The Sails AT Laguna Club Dev. Corp., 403 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Womack v. The Madison Drug Co., 155 Fla. 335 (Fla. 1944)
- Neveils v. Thagard, 145 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
- Int'l Patrol & Detective Agency, Inc. v. AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 396 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Int'l Patrol & Detective Agency Co., Inc. v. AETNA Cas. & Sur. Co., 419 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1982)
- Steffani v. State, 419 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1982)
- Janeczek v. Embry, 330 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- City OF Miami Beach v. Smith, 257 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1971)