DEBRA ANN BRELAND, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID ERIC BRELAND, APPELLEE
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Debra Breland appeals a divorce decree that awarded her exclusive use of the marital home but denied her a credit for ownership expenses (mortgage, taxes, insurance, upkeep) she paid while the property was jointly owned. The court reversed, holding that Florida law requires a credit for such expenses against the other spouse's share of sale proceeds, even when the paying spouse receives exclusive possession and the expenses equal fair rental value.
The court held that a spouse required to pay all ownership expenses on jointly-owned property is entitled to a credit against the other spouse's one-half share of sale proceeds, even when that spouse has exclusive possession and the expenses equal fair rental value. The trial court's denial of the credit was reversed.
[1] A party awarded exclusive possession of jointly-owned marital property in a dissolution judgment, who is solely responsible for ownership expenses, is entitled to a credi…
[2] A spouse may not be required to build the other spouse's equity in jointly-owned property through payment of ownership expenses during a dissolution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where a court requires one party to a dissolution to pay all of the ownership expenses on jointly-owned property, such party is entitled to a credit against the other party's one half of the proceeds upon the sale of the property”
Statement of the controlling legal principle that the trial court violated
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution of marriage, the trial court awarded Debra exclusive use and possession of the jointly-owned marital home while she remained single a…
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ZEHMER, Judge.
Debra Breland appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage wherein the court awarded her exclusive use and possession of the jointly-owned marital home for as long as she remains single and at least one of the children of the marriage is a dependent minor residing with her, and provided that she be solely responsible for the mortgage payments, real estate taxes, insurance and upkeep. She complains about the provision that upon sale of the marital home, the net proceeds after any mortgage indebtedness remaining and all costs incident to the sale have been paid shall be divided equally between her and David Breland, her former husband. The court denied her credit for these expenses to the extent that they exceeded her obligation as a tenant in common, because it found such expenses to equal the reasonable rental value of her former husband’s one-half interest in the property. Despite the apparent reasonableness of this approach, we are compelled to reverse because this disposition contravenes the applicable principle of law.1
The law is well established that where a court requires one party to a dissolution to pay all of the ownership expenses on jointly-owned property, such party is entitled to a credit against the other party’s one half of the proceeds upon the sale of the property. Smith v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Rubino v. Rubino, 372 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Fischer v. Fischer, 503 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Delehant v. Delehant, 442 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Even where the party paying the ownership expenses is awarded exclusive possession of the property and the court finds that one half of the monthly payments is fair rental value for use of the other party’s one-half interest in the property, this principle of law still applies on the theory that one spouse may not be required to build the other spouse’s equity in the property. Smith v. Smith, 390 So. 2d at 1224; Singer v. Singer, 342 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We express no view on the wisdom or fairness of this principle.
Because our reversal necessarily affects the lower court’s overall plan for equitable distribution of the marital property, child support, and alimony, we vacate all these provisions of the final judgment and remand for reconsideration.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SMITH, J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., specially concurs with opinion.
. Our review of this provision is not based on the abuse of discretion standard, as we find no basis for reversal under this standard of appellate review.
BOOTH, Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result of this opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Sweeney v. Noemi J. Sweeney, 583 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…e all of the provisions awarded and remand the cause for the trial court to reconsider the entire equitable scheme in an effort to do equity and justice to both parties. See McMahan v. McMahan, 567 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Breland v. Breland, 565 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). We AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ZEHMER and MINER, JJ., concur. . See, e.g., Shea v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 780 F. 2d 561 (6th Cir.1986).…
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Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 669 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…al payments (mortgage, insurance, taxes, dues and repairs) against her husband’s one-half of the net proceeds upon sale of the property. She relies on cases from three other district courts in support of this argument. See, e.g., Breland v. Breland, 565 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Fischer v. Fischer, 503 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); and Delehant v. Delehant, 442 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). The underlying rationale appears to be that, even though one party is deprived of occupancy of the jointly-own…
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Blauvelt v. Blauvelt, 681 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…erred by not providing in its order that at the time the marital residence is sold that the husband would receive proper credit against the wife’s one-half of the proceeds for certain ownership expenses he is required to pay. See Breland v. Breland, 565 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Therefore, we remand to the trial court with directions that the final judgment be clarified to allow the husband proper credit upon the sale of the marital residence. Affirmed as modified. SCHOONOVER, AC.J., and PARKER and…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Maita P. Singer v. Singer, 342 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Rubino v. Rubino, 372 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Smith v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)
- Anne Marie Fischer v. Fischer, 503 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Dorothea Margaret Delehant v. Delehant, 442 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)