L.J., A CHILD, PETITIONER,
v.
RONALD FRYER, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE BROWARD REGIONAL JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER, RESPONDENT
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A Florida appellate court granted habeas corpus relief to a juvenile held in secure detention for over 50 days, far exceeding the statutory maximum of 21 days. The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend the detention period once the statutory maximum had expired, regardless of delays attributable to obtaining legal counsel.
Once the statutory 21-day maximum detention period expires, the court is without jurisdiction to extend the detention. Delays resulting from the parents' failure to obtain an attorney and continuances requested after expiration of the maximum period do not constitute 'good cause' under the statute to extend detention, and the child must be released.
[1] A juvenile held in secure detention beyond the statutory maximum period is entitled to release from detention.
[2] A trial court cannot retroactively extend the statutory maximum detention period for a juvenile after the period has expired.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Subsection (6)(b) provides for a maximum detention period of twenty-one (21) days unless an adjudicatory hearing has been commenced.”
Establishes the statutory maximum detention period for juveniles
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceL.J., a juvenile, was held in secure detention for more than 50 days, well beyond the 21-day maximum provided by Florida Statute § 39.032(6)(b). The t…
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PER CURIAM.
The petition for writ of mandamus is construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and is hereby granted. By order previously transmitted, we have directed the release of this petitioner from secure detention, with this opinion to follow.
Petitioner L.J., a juvenile, was held in secure detention for more than fifty (50) days, well beyond the provisions of section 39.032(6), Florida Statutes (1989). Subsection (6)(b) provides for a maximum detention period of twenty-one (21) days unless an adjudicatory hearing has been commenced. Subsection (6)(d) provides that the twenty-one day period does not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for good cause shown on motion of the child, his counsel, or the State, or on motion of the court.
The record of proceedings below shows that the trial court acknowledged that petitioner had been held beyond the maximum twenty-one day period, but attempted, after the expiration of that period, to retroactively and sua sponte continue the detention period under section (6)(d), on the grounds that petitioner’s parents had failed to provide an attorney to represent their son. We hold that this does not constitute “good cause” under subsection (6)(d). The twenty-one day maximum period for detention had already expired when the trial judge continued the case for petitioner’s parents to obtain legal counsel. It had expired when the trial judge later refused to release petitioner at the request of the Public Defender’s office. That ruling was based on the trial judge’s uncertainty as to whether the Public Defender had been officially appointed to represent petitioner. Represented or not, petitioner was entitled to release from detention. The statute is unequivocal. Once the maximum detention period expires, the court is without jurisdiction to extend original detention. T.W.C. v. Pate, 369 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA), reh’g denied, (1979). See also P.R. v. Johnson, 541 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
When the trial judge denied release the last time, he also ruled that the Public Defender, then acknowledged to have been appointed, had requested a continuance of the proceedings. The judge construed this as a waiver of the maximum twenty-one day detention period. We disagree. Again, continuance was requested well after expiration of the maximum detention period.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of ha-beas corpus is granted.
HERSEY, C.J., and LETTS and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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A.M.W. v. Portesy, 714 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…hed principle that a juvenile cannot be detained for longer than twenty-one days on the same offense. See, e.g., T.O. v. Alachua Regional Juvenile Detention Center, 668 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff'd, 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla.1996); L.J. v. Fryer, 565 So. 2d 713, 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Because the second detention of A.M.W. was unauthorized, A.M.W. was entitled to immediate relief, which was granted by prior order of this court. FULMER, A.C.J., and GREEN and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur.…
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B.G. v. Fryer, 570 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…f “good cause” must be predicated on a record containing competent evidence of the reasons for continuing the maximum twenty-one day detention period before an adjudicatory hearing must take place. Finally, this court recently said in L.J. v. Fryer, 565 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), that “good cause” cannot be based merely on the failure of a juvenile’s parents to retain legal counsel for the juvenile before the expiration of the twenty-one day period. Applied to the four cases herein, this authority estab…
Authorities Cited
- P.R. v. Johnson, 541 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
- T. W. C. v. Pate, 369 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)