S.C.B., A CHILD

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

PER CURIAM.

S.C.B., a juvenile, appeals the trial court’s disposition orders entered in four cases below following a plea. S.C.B. was adjudicated delinquent on one count of dealing or trafficking in stolen property, a second-degree felony; four counts of burglary of a conveyance and two counts of grand theft, which are third-degree felonies; as well as two

counts of petit theft and one count of misdemeanor possession of cannabis. The trial court committed S.C.B. to a non-secure residential program to be followed by probation after his release from commitment.

S.C.B. raises two issues on appeal.

First, he argues that the trial court erred when it adjudicated him delinquent of dealing or trafficking in stolen property when he did not plead guilty to that charge. S.C.B. contends that this is significant because not only was he wrongfully adjudicated, but also the recommended dispositions on all four cases contained in the Department of Juvenile Justice’s (“DJJ”) Pre-Disposition Report (“PDR”), which the trial court followed, were based, to a significant extent, on the DJJ’s belief that S.C.B. had pleaded guilty to dealing or trafficking in stolen property, which was the most serious charge that he faced. S.C.B. submits that, as a result, all four disposition orders must be vacated and a new disposition hearing be held with a corrected predisposition report.

Second, S.C.B. asserts that the trial court erred in proceeding with the disposition hearing and thereafter committing him to a residential program without first having received and considered the results of a mandatory Comprehensive Evaluation Report.¹ We agree with S.C.B.’s first argument and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. As a result, S.C.B.’s second issue has been rendered moot, and we do not address it any further. The State filed four separate petitions for delinquency against S.C.B. involving a total of seventeen charges. Shortly after the petitions were filed, S.C.B. and the State entered into a single plea agreement applicable to all four cases, in which S.C.B. would plead guilty to ten of the counts and the court would order the preparation of a PDR prior

to the disposition hearing. In exchange for S.C.B.’s guilty plea, the State agreed to file a nolle prosequi as to the remaining seven charges. Pertinent here, and as conceded by the State, S.C.B. did not plead guilty to dealing or trafficking in stolen property because, per the plea agreement, that charge was to be “nol prossed.” The trial court accepted the plea and ordered the PDR. The predisposition report prepared by the DJJ and delivered to the court showed that, contrary to the plea agreement, the DJJ erroneously believed that S.C.B. pleaded guilty to dealing or trafficking in stolen property. The DJJ’s recommendation to the court on the four cases was to commit S.C.B. to a non-secure residential program to be followed by probation. At the disposition hearing, S.C.B.’s counsel raised the issue of this error in the predisposition report. Our record does not reflect that the trial court addressed, or even acknowledged, the erroneous predisposition report. The court imposed the DJJ’s recommended sanctions and entered an incorrect disposition order adjudicating S.C.B. delinquent of dealing or trafficking in stolen property.

On appeal, the State concedes that the disposition order adjudicating S.C.B. delinquent of this charge in that one case should be vacated but contends that the remedy is simply to enter a disposition order adjudicating S.C.B. delinquent of grand theft, which was the only charge to which S.C.B. actually pleaded guilty in that case. The State disputes the need for a new disposition hearing in all four cases, arguing that the record conclusively shows that the trial court still would have committed S.C.B. to a non-secure residential program and post-commitment probation in these four cases, even with a correct predisposition report. We disagree for two reasons.

First, the trial court did not expressly state this on the record, despite being placed on notice by S.C.B.’s counsel at the disposition hearing of the error in the predisposition report.

Second, we find it significant that the error in the predisposition report applied to the only second-degree felony charged in these cases, and we are not convinced by our record that the DJJ would have made the same recommendation to the trial court to commit S.C.B. to a non-secure residential program had it known that S.C.B. had only pleaded guilty to third-degree felonies. Stated differently, the State’s argument would be much more persuasive if, for example, instead of being charged with one second-degree felony, S.C.B. had been charged with five second-degree felonies, pleaded guilty to four of these felonies (plus the other lesser charges to which he pleaded), but the predisposition report submitted to the court erroneously represented that S.C.B. had pleaded guilty to all five second-degree felonies and thereafter recommended that S.C.B. be committed to a non-secure residential program.

Accordingly, we vacate the disposition orders entered by the trial court in the four cases and remand for the court to conduct a new disposition hearing after it has received and reviewed a corrected predisposition report from the DJJ.

REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.

LAMBERT, EDWARDS, and EISNAUGLE, JJ., concur.