STEPHEN JEREMY ROBINSON
v.
JENNIFER LEA ROBINSON
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This case involves consolidated appeals by a former husband challenging trial court orders related to child support, alimony, and uncovered medical expenses. The appellate court vacated contempt findings in two instances due to vague orders or premature calculations, while affirming other aspects of the lower court's decisions.
The court held that the contempt finding for failure to pay uncovered medical expenses was erroneous because the underlying order was too vague. It also held that the order determining child support arrearages was premature because a required accounting had not been completed. The court vacated these specific findings.
[1] A party cannot be held in contempt for violating a court order if the order is not sufficiently explicit or precise to put the party on notice of what they must or must n…
[2] An order determining a party's arrearages is premature if it is entered before a required accounting of payments has been performed and considered by the court.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In either the civil or criminal contempt scenario, a person cannot be held in contempt for violating a court’s order if the order is not sufficiently explicit or precise to put a party on notice of exactly what it must or must not do.”
Establishes the legal standard for contempt findings, emphasizing the need for clear and precise court orders.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband appealed two contempt orders and an order adjusting child support arrearages. One contempt order stemmed from failure to pay the ch…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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LAMBERT, J.
In these consolidated appeals, Stephen Jeremy Robinson (“Former Husband”) appeals the trial court’s two post-final-judgment orders adjudicating him in civil contempt for failing to pay his share of certain medical, dental, and optical expenses incurred on behalf of his minor children and for failing to pay his child support obligations owed by him to the appellee, Jennifer Lea Robinson (“Former Wife”), arising from the dissolution of their marriage. Former Husband also appeals a separate post-judgment order directing the clerk of court to adjust its child support payment records to reflect that, as of February 27, 2017, Former Husband owed child support arrearages in the sum of $6931.50. In this opinion, we first provide a brief history of the case, and we then address each order under review in the specific appellate case in which the order is being appealed. In 2012, the parties decided to end their marriage. To that end, they executed a marital settlement agreement in March 2012 to resolve their respective rights and obligations to each other in dissolving their marriage. Pertinent here, Former Husband was to pay to Former Wife the sum of $300 per month in durational alimony for a period of fifty-four months; and the parties were to share the parental responsibility for the care and upbringing of their two minor children, with Former Husband paying child support to Former Wife in the sum of $900 per month. Though the agreement was not executed until March, Former Husband’s alimony and child support payments were to commence as of January1, 2012. The parties also agreed to maintain insurance coverage for the benefit of their children, with any medical, dental, optical, orthodontic, mental health care, and other medically necessary expenses not covered by the insurance to be split evenly between them.
In April 2012, Former Wife filed her petition for dissolution of marriage, requesting that the marriage be dissolved and the parties’ marital settlement agreement be approved. Former Husband answered; and, in May 2012, the case came before a general magistrate. Following a hearing, the magistrate issued a written report finding that the parties’ marriage was irretrievably broken and approving their marital settlement agreement.
The trial court thereafter entered a final judgment approving, adopting, and incorporating the general magistrate’s report and the parties’ marital settlement agreement into the judgment, effectively dissolving the parties’ marriage.
Appellate Case 5D17-1109— In this appeal, Former Husband challenges the trial court’s order finding him in civil contempt for failing to pay his share of the children’s uncovered medical, dental, and optical expenses incurred in 2015. Due to time constraints, the hearing that was held on Former Wife’s contempt motion was adjourned prior to Former Husband putting on his defense and without the actual bills in dispute being placed into evidence.
Nevertheless, by order dated November2, 2015, Former Husband was to bring “current within ninety days” those expenses “for which he had received documentation.” Following another hearing, the court entered an order on September 16, 2016, finding Former Husband in contempt of the November2, 2015 order for willfully failing to pay the sum of $3155.07 for the children’s uncovered medical, dental, and optical expenses incurred in 2015. In his initial brief and at the recently-held oral argument, Former Husband represented to this court that he no longer contests the amount determined to be his share of these expenses. Former Husband does, however, maintain that the trial court erred in adjudicating him in contempt of court, asserting that the November2, 2015 order upon which the later contempt order was based was too vague and imprecise for him to be found in contempt for his alleged failure to comply with the order.
We agree. “In either the civil or criminal contempt scenario, a person cannot be held in contempt for violating a court’s order if the order is not sufficiently explicit or precise to put a party on notice of exactly what it must or must not do.” See Wilcoxon v. Moller, 132 So. 3d 281, 286–87 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citing Marcus v. Marcus, 902 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)).
Here, the November2, 2015 order requiring that Former Husband bring current, within ninety days, those expenses for which he had received documentation was too imprecise to subject Former Husband to the later adjudication of contempt for nonpayment of $3155.07 for the children’s uncovered medical, dental, and optical expenses. That Former Husband, during this appeal, chose to no longer contest the sum determined to be owed does not ameliorate the error. We therefore vacate that portion of the September 16, 2016 order adjudicating Former Husband in contempt.
We affirm the remaining aspects of the order without further discussion.
Appellate Case 5D17-2427— The genesis of this appeal arose in 2016 when Former Husband claimed that the clerk of court’s office advised him that its records showed that he had a credit of $4623.21 resulting from an overpayment of his alimony obligation and that it would begin applying this credit against Former Husband’s future monthly child support payments. In reliance, Former Husband discontinued paying his monthly child support payments until this “credit” was fully utilized. After not receiving child support, Former Wife filed a motion for contempt.
On June 28, 2017, following a hearing held in February 2017, the court entered the order under review in this appeal, directing the clerk of court “to conduct an accounting of the record of payments of alimony and child support in this matter back to the beginning of the obligation(s)” and to report to the court its findings. In this same order, and prior to the contemporaneously-ordered accounting being performed, the court nonetheless directed the clerk of court to “correct” its records to show that, as of February 27, 2017, Former Husband owed child support arrearages in the sum of $6931.50. The court also denied
Former Husband’s request that his “credit” be applied towards his future child support payments. Former Husband appealed. Because the clerk of court’s accounting had not been performed, we conclude that the order contemporaneously determining Former Husband’s child support arrearages as of February 27, 2017, was premature. As we more fully explain below, based upon the timing of our disposition of these appeals, we find it unnecessary to directly address Former Husband’s argument that the trial court erred in refusing to apply his alimony credit against his then future child support payments.
Appellate Case 5D18-1467— In the order under review in this third appeal, the trial court found Former Husband in willful contempt of court for his nonpayment of the $6931.50 arrearages. For similar reasons as those expressed in our disposition of the order under review in Case No. 5D17-2427, because the present record does not show that the trial court’s previously ordered accounting of Former Husband’s child support and alimony payments, if prepared, was ever admitted into evidence or considered by the trial court, we conclude that the trial court’s order adjudicating Former Husband in contempt for nonpayment of this $6931.50 arrearage was also premature. At present, the parties’ two children have both attained the age of majority; and Former Husband’s alimony obligation to Former Wife has ended.
Thus, Former Husband has no future support obligations owed to Former Wife. Based on these facts, and with the benefit of hindsight, there appears to be a fairly clear path to a final resolution of the parties’ dispute as to what, if any, child support or alimony obligations remain owed by Former Husband.
First, the total amount of alimony and child support payments that Former Husband was to have paid, plus any applicable clerk’s fees, from January1, 2012, until his last child support payment became due, is readily calculable.1 Second, other than for the months of January through March 2012, Former Husband’s child support payments were to have all been paid through the clerk of court, meaning that the total amount of child support payments actually made by Former Husband is essentially determinable through the clerk of court’s records.
Third, our record indicates that beginning with at least the January1, 2013 payment, Former Husband’s alimony payments were also apparently paid by him through the clerk of court.
Thus, like child support, the bulk of alimony payments made by Former Husband are calculable through the clerk of court’s records.
Fourth, because it does not appear that the clerk’s accounting of Former Husband’s payment history has ever been admitted into evidence or properly brought to the trial court’s attention, a final accounting of all alimony and child support payments made by Former Husband through the clerk’s office should be prepared by the clerk of court and presented to the trial court at a subsequent hearing.2
JACOBUS, B.W., Senior Judge, and STARR, E.J., Associate Judge, concur.