STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM N. ELDRIDGE, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's suppression of evidence in a DUI case, arguing that a deputy had authority to arrest a defendant for a misdemeanor traffic violation based on another officer's observations and delegation of arrest authority under Florida law.
A peace officer who lawfully observes a misdemeanor traffic violation may delegate arrest authority to another officer under Florida Statute § 901.18, and the delegated officer may execute the arrest based on the observing officer's observations and report, even if the delegated officer did not personally witness the violation.
[1] A law enforcement officer may summon assistance from other individuals to make a lawful arrest.
[2] A person commanded to aid a peace officer in making an arrest possesses the same arrest authority as the commanding officer.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he deems necessary to make the arrest. A person commanded to aid shall render assistance as directed by the officer. A person commanded to aid a peace officer shall have the same authority to arrest as that peace officer”
The statutory language from § 901.18, Fla. Stat. (1987) that grants delegated arrest authority, establishing the legal basis for the court's holding
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeputy Burton observed a truck matching a theft suspect description and stopped it. When the defendant exited the truck, Burton noticed signs of intox…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
This appeal presents a question certified to be of great public importance by the county court. The issue before us concerns the authority of a law enforcement officer to make a warrantless arrest on a misdemeanor charge. We exercised our discretionary review power and accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4)(B).
The defendant was charged with driving under the influence (DUI), a misdemeanor proscribed by section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1987). The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, holding that his arrest was unlawful. We reverse.
The facts are undisputed. Deputy Linda Burton of the Hillsborough Sheriff’s Department observed the defendant and a woman passenger in a truck. Burton stopped the couple based on a description given to her in connection with a theft she was investigating. When the defendant exited the truck, Burton noticed that he smelled of alcohol and exhibited other indicia of intoxication. Burton called for backup assistance, and Deputy Thomas Martinez responded. Martinez arrested the defendant for DUI, while Burton completed the paperwork on the theft charge.
The state filed this appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B), seeking to overturn the trial court’s order suppressing evidence. The defendant seeks to sustain the suppression by arguing that a warrantless arrest on a misde meanor charge may only be made when the misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the arresting officer. § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1987) (presence requirement pertains to all misdemeanors); § 901.15(5) (presence requirement specifically relates to violations of chapter 316, traffic offenses). The defendant contends that since Martinez did not see him in actual physical control of the truck, his arrest by Martinez was unlawful.
The state, however, argues that section 901.18, Florida Statutes (1987), authorized Deputy Burton to delegate her authority to arrest to Deputy Martinez. We agree. That statute provides:
OFFICER MAY SUMMON ASSISTANCE
A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he deems necessary to make the arrest. A person commanded to aid shall render assistance as directed by the officer. A person commanded to aid a peace officer shall have the same authority to arrest as that peace officer
(Emphasis added). See McClendon v. State, 440 So. 2d 52 (Fla.lst DCA 1983). See also State v. Kehoe, 498 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), affirmed, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.1988); Kirby v. State, 217 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969).
Deputy Burton, who observed the defendant’s violation of chapter 316 and was engaged in making a lawful arrest, had the right to summon the assistance of Deputy Martinez. We agree with the state’s argument that Martinez, in turn, had the authority to make the arrest based on Burton’s observations and report. To hold otherwise may allow a suspect to frustrate an on-the-scene arrest by incapacitating the officer conducting an investigation in the first instance.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CAMPBELL and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (13 total)
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Steiner v. State, 690 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…ccident” he may develop probable cause to charge DUI. Finally, where one officer calls upon another for assistance, the combined observations of the two or more officers may be united to establish the probable cause to arrest. See State v. Eldridge, 565 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The county court concluded that no “accident” occurred in the instant case, as such term is commonly recognized to the general public. Rather, the court concluded that this case involved a malfunction of the vehicle resulting in…
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State v. Boatman, 901 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…sons she or he deems necessary to make the arrest.” Under that statute, we have expressly allowed an officer observing a misdemeanor in his presence to delegate to a fellow officer the authority to make the misdemeanor arrest. See State v. Eldridge, 565 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also Huebner v. State, 731 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Kirby v. State, 217 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). Of course, under section 901.15(1), that delegated arrest power must still be exercised “immediately” or in “fresh…
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State v. Johnson, 695 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…rpose.” . See Carbone v. State, 564 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Jackson v. State, 456 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); State v. Williams, 417 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). . See Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648 (Fla.1995); State v. Eldridge, 565 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1988)
- Kirby v. State, 217 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- State v. Kehoe, 498 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- McCLENDON v. State, 440 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)