KIMBERLY WASSMER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kimberly Wassmer pleaded nolo contendere to cocaine possession but reserved the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. The court held that a motel security guard violated her Fourth Amendment privacy rights by using a passkey to open her hotel room door without consent, and reversed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.
A motel security guard has no power to waive a guest's Fourth Amendment privacy rights by forcing open the door of a guest who refuses to open it. A hotel or motel room occupied by a paying guest is entitled to the same constitutional protections as a private permanent dwelling, and the warrantless entry violated Wassmer's Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
[1] A hotel or motel room is afforded the same Fourth Amendment privacy protections as a private dwelling so long as the occupant is legally present and has paid or arranged…
[2] A motel security guard or manager cannot waive a hotel guest's Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A motel manager has no power by consent or invitation to waive a guest's fourth amendment privacy rights.”
Establishes the core principle that a motel manager cannot consent to a warrantless search of a guest's room.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn late 1987, Days Inn security guard Guy Dekin observed Michael O'Farrell entering Wassmer's hotel room. O'Farrell had been previously warned and for…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
Kimberly Wassmer pleaded nolo conten-dere to possession of cocaine and possession of paraphernalia but reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. She contends, rightfully, that the evidence was the fruit of an unlawful search. We reverse.
The events leading to Wassmer’s arrest began in late 1987 when Guy Dekin, a Days Inn security guard, saw Michael O’Farrell entering Wassmer’s hotel room. O’Farrell had caused trouble at Days Inn in the past, and Dekin knew that he had been warned to stay off the property. In fact, Days Inn management had given O’Farrell a formal trespass warning. Therefore, Dekin carefully noted which room O’Farrell was in and called the police to have him removed.
When law enforcement officers arrived, Dekin went with them to the room and knocked. Wassmer peeked out, but did not open the door, so after knocking again Dekin used his passkey to open it. Before they entered the room, officers recognized a crushed aluminum can on the floor as cocaine paraphernalia. Once inside, they found rock cocaine on the floor as well.
We conclude that Dekin’s opening the door to Wassmer’s room violated her fourth amendment privacy rights. A motel manager has no power by consent or invitation to waive a guest’s fourth amendment privacy rights. McGibiany v. State, 399 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Sheff v. State, 301 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), aff'd, 329 So. 2d 270 (Fla.1976). Nor does a motel security guard have the power to do so by forcing open the door of a guest who refuses to open it.
In McGibiany, an assistant manager went to investigate the occupancy of an officially vacant room. An off-duty law enforcement officer, who was working as a hotel security guard, went along to protect her. Before they realized that the room was lawfully occupied, they found contraband inside it.
The First District held this an unlawful search. It concluded that because a law enforcement officer accompanied the manager and participated in the search, that all constitutional restrictions applied. It went on to say:
While it may be assumed that the manager had a right to enter room 715 for the purposes indicated, and that Sgt. Dozier had a right to stand in the doorway, viewing all that could be observed, until it was evident that no occupant threatened harm to the manager, Sgt. Dozier’s lawful power ended at the threshold.
399 So. 2d at 126. The manager in McGi-biany had the right to investigate the suspected unlawful occupancy. Dekin had no similar right; he knew that the room was lawfully rented to Wassmer. A hotel or motel room is the private dwelling of the occupant so long as he is legally there, has paid or arranged to pay rent, and has not been requested by the management to leave. The rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution to occupants of private permanent dwellings must be afforded to transient hotel or motel guests. Sheff v. State, 301 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), aff'd, 329 So. 2d 270 (Fla.1976). Because law enforcement officers participated in this search, all constitutional restrictions applied. McGibiany, 399 So. 2d at 126. In this case they were violated, and the trial court erred in denying Wassmer’s motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1994)…tting physical evidence seized from the motel room and in admitting Turner’s confession. A motel room is considered a private dwelling if the occupant is there legally, has paid or arranged to pay, and has not been asked to leave. Wassmer v. State, 565 So. 2d 856, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Thus, constitutional rights and privileges that apply to occupants of private permanent dwellings also apply to motel guests. Id. That said, we find nothing improper with the uniformed Georgia officers knocking on the door a…
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Gnann v. State, 662 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…ces are present. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). A motel room is considered a private dwelling if the occupant is there legally, has paid or arranged to pay, and has not been asked to leave. Wassmer v. State, 565 So. 2d 856, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). The constitutional rights and privileges that apply to occupants of private permanent dwellings also apply to motel guests. Wassmer; Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444, 447 (Fla.1994). Gnann was arrested, without a warrant, fo…
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Nelson v. State, 867 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…eighteen inches to three feet of the lower door jam area of his hotel room. HOTEL MANAGEMENT’S INVITATION TO POLICE Nelson cites Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla.1994), Gnann v. State, 662 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), and Wass-mer v. State, 565 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), for the general rule that constitutional rights and privileges that apply to occupants of private permanent dwellings also apply to hotel guests and that a hotel manager has no power by consent or invitation to waive a guest’s Fo…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sheff v. State, 329 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1976)
- Sheff v. State, 301 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- McGIBIANY v. State, 399 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)