D. L.

v.

THE DEVEREAUX FOUNDATION, INC. D/B/A DEVEREAUX FLORIDA, COMMUNITY BASED CARE OF BREVARD, INC. D/B/A BREVARD FAMILY PARTNERSHIP AND BARBARA JONES

SOUD, J.

Appellant D.L. brought her lawsuit against Appellees Community Based Care of Brevard, Inc., d/b/a Brevard Family Partnership, the Devereux Foundation, Inc., and Barbara Jones alleging that their individual and collective negligence caused her to become a victim of sexual battery while a minor in the foster care system. The trial court dismissed D.L.'s claims against Brevard Family Partnership and Jones and granted summary final judgment in favor of the Foundation, concluding D.L.'s claims against the Appellees were barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2022). D.L. appeals these decisions, arguing that section 95.11(9) allows her claim to be brought at any time. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b). We reverse and remand for further proceedings, as we conclude the trial court erred in its determination that the four-year statute of limitations barred D.L.'s suit.

I.

The allegations in D.L.'s complaint are relatively straightforward. D.L. was born in 2000. She was removed from the care and custody of her biological parents in 2009 and placed with a family member. Because of physical limitations of that family member, the Florida Department of Children and Families placed D.L. in foster care in 2012. The Department contracted with Brevard Family Partnership to provide foster care and related services to children such as D.L. Brevard Family Partnership in turn contracted with the Foundation to provide foster care licensing, management, and other related services. Ultimately, D.L. was placed in the foster home of Bobby and Barbara Jones, who were licensed foster parents.

In June 2014, D.L. disclosed that she was “molested by another child while living in the Jones' foster home.” Notwithstanding the Joneses' knowledge of these allegations, they “took no actions to protect D.L.” In 2015, following the closure of the Jones' foster home in November 2014, D.L. further disclosed that Bobby Jones sexually battered her. In her three-count complaint filed in 2023, D.L. claimed that Brevard Family Partnership (Count I) and the Foundation (Count II) were each negligent by failing to appropriately screen the Jones home and continue to assess the safety of children placed there, thus allowing D.L. to be placed and remain in the home where she was sexually battered. D.L. also claimed that Barbara Jones (Count III) was negligent in failing to use reasonable care while caring for D.L., and failing to prevent D.L. from being sexually abused by Barbara Jones's husband, Bobby, as well as other children within the home.¹

Brevard Family Partnership and Jones each moved to dismiss D.L.'s complaint, arguing that since her claims sound in negligence and not intentional or criminal acts of Brevard Family Partnership or Jones, D.L.'s claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(a).² D.L. responded that section 95.11(9) allowed her to bring her action “at any time” because it was "related to” the sexual battery she alleged she suffered. Acknowledging that these motions presented a “difficult call," the

Thereafter, the Foundation moved for summary judgment, based on essentially the same argument that D.L.'s claim against it, sounding in negligence, was barred by 95.11(3)(a)'s four-year statute of limitations. Consistent with its prior ruling, the trial court granted the motion and entered summary final judgment in favor of the Foundation, recognizing this case was a “close call,” that there was not much caselaw addressing the legal issue presented, and that the issue was one the appellate courts should resolve.

This appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo the trial court's dismissal of D.L.'s claims against Brevard Family Partnership and Jones, as we do the summary final judgment entered against her in favor of the Foundation. See Baldwin v. Labʼy Corp. of Am., 396 So. 3d 798, 800 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (“The trial court's dismissal of this case, requiring the interpretation of Florida Statutes, presents a pure question of law. Thus, our review is de novo.”); see also State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (“This question of statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review.”); Bradenton Grp., Inc. v. State, 970 So. 2d 403, 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“The standard of review for orders on summary judgment is de novo.”).

A.

The Florida Legislature “has adopted a comprehensive statutory framework to govern limitations periods.” R.R. v. New Life Cmty. Church of CMA, Inc., 303 So. 3d 916, 918 (Fla. 2020). In doing so, the Legislature has given considerable attention to addressing the “difficult questions about how best to balance the interests of minors with the interests served by statutes of limitations, especially in cases like this one.” Id. at 918.

When deciding whether a limitations provision bars a claim, our work is relatively well-defined and statutorily driven. See id. at 923 ("[B]asic principles of statutory interpretation and, more broadly, of separation of powers ... [require] courts ... faithfully apply the ... rules prescribed by the Legislature."). In this context, our analysis considers three distinct, yet related, questions: (1) what statute of limitations provision applies; (2) when did the statute begin to run, i.e., when did the cause of action accrue; and (3) whether a tolling provision is provided by statute that suspended the running of the limitations period for a length of time. See id. at 920.

Our resolution of this appeal hinges entirely on our answer to the first question:³ which statute of limitation applies—are D.L.'s negligence claims subject to section 95.11(3)(a)'s four-year statute of limitations for negligence actions, or do her claims fall under section 95.11(9), which allows claims “related to” sexual abuse she suffered while under 16 years of age to be brought at any time? In considering this issue, we must turn to the language of the respective statutes.

B.

At the time D.L. filed her complaint, Florida law generally required actions founded on negligence to be commenced within four years. See § 95.11(3)(a), Fla. Stat. However, as part of the comprehensive framework governing limitation periods, in 2010 the Florida Legislature “abolished the statute of limitations for actions related to [sexual] battery on a victim under 16, so long as the claim was not time-barred on or before July¹, 2010.” Doe¹ v.³ The parties before us do not dispute that D.L.'s causes of action accrued at the time provided by the "statutory default rule," see R.R., 303 So. 3d at 922—“when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. And in cases such as this, that would be when the sexual abuse was inflicted upon the victim. See R.R., 303 So. 3d at 921. Likewise, D.L. does not suggest the applicable statute of limitations was tolled. Rather, the entirety of her argument rests on her contention that section 95.11(9) allows her to bring her case “at any time.” Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 360 So. 3d 778, 782 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). Specifically, section 95.11(9)4 provided:

An action related to an act constituting a violation of s. 794.011 involving a victim who was under the age of 16 at the time of the act may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any such action other than one which would have been time barred on or before July 1, 2010.

§ 95.11(9), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, under the applicable version of the statute, for an action to be permitted under this statute, it must: (1) “relate to”; (2) an act violative of section 794.011 (a sexual battery); (3) committed against a victim less than 16 years of age when the battery was committed; and (4) not be time-barred on or before July¹, 2010. See id.

There is no material dispute that the allegations in D.L.'s complaint fall within the last three statutory requirements; that is, she alleges she was the victim of a sexual battery when a minor under the age of 16 years that occurred after she was placed in the Jones' foster home in August 2012 (post July¹, 2010). As a result, the dispositive issue is whether D.L.'s claims against Appellees are "related to” the alleged sexual battery she suffered. If they are, section 95.11(9) allowed her to bring her case “at any time," and section 95.11(3)(a)'s four-year limitation did not bar her suit.