CARL JERNIGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carl Jernigan appealed his convictions for disorderly intoxication and resisting arrest without violence. The court reversed the disorderly intoxication conviction due to insufficient evidence of endangerment to public safety, but affirmed the resisting arrest conviction because officers had probable cause to arrest him for trespass, an independent charge.
The conviction for disorderly intoxication is reversed because the evidence did not prove that public safety was endangered, as required by statute. The conviction for resisting arrest without violence is affirmed because officers had probable cause to arrest Jernigan for trespass, an independent charge, making the arrest lawful despite the reversal of the disorderly intoxication conviction.
[1] A conviction for disorderly intoxication requires proof that the defendant was intoxicated and that public safety was endangered.
[2] A conviction for resisting arrest without violence will be affirmed if the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for an independent offense, even i…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To sustain a conviction for disorderly intoxication as described in section 856.-011(1), Florida Statutes, the state must prove not only that a person is intoxicated but that the public safety is endangered.”
Establishes the legal standard required for disorderly intoxication conviction, which requires proof of endangerment to public safety beyond mere intoxication.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJernigan, a police dispatcher, came to the police station intoxicated and upset over a relationship. After initially being escorted out, he returned, …
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WOLF, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment and sentence finding the appellant guilty of disorderly intoxication and resisting arrest without violence. The appellant raises two issues on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court erred in not granting a motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of disorderly intoxication where there was insufficient evidence presented to support the charge, and (2) whether appellant’s conviction for resisting arrest without violence must be vacated if the court determines that the motion for judgment of acquittal on the disorderly intoxication count should have been granted. We reverse as to issue 1 and affirm as to issue 2.
The appellant, a dispatcher for the City of Alachua Police Department, went to the police station on May 19, 1988, while intoxicated and distraught over a relationship with a female dispatcher. One of the police officers talked the appellant into going outside to a loading ramp so as not to disturb the operations of the police department, and after a brief period, talked the appellant into leaving. Later that night, however, the appellant returned to the station. He came in the rear door, threw down his keys then took off his sunglasses, crumpled them, and threw them down. According to the chief of police, the presence of Jernigan upset the entire police department.
The appellant was again escorted to the loading ramp where he had a discussion with the chief and two officers. Chief Dampier testified that Jernigan used profanity, but Officer West could not recall that appellant had used profanity. Chief Dampier told Jernigan that if he did not leave he would be arrested. Jernigan stated that there weren’t enough of them to arrest him and stiffened his arms to prevent being handcuffed. A scuffle ensued where the appellant put one of the officers in a headlock and ripped his shirt. The appellant was ultimately subdued and arrested.
The officers all agreed that Jernigan appeared to be intoxicated. Chief Dampier thought he was intoxicated enough to be arrested for DUI.
The appellant was charged with disorderly intoxication and resisting arrest with violence. A trial was held, and at the end of the state’s case, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal. The motion was denied. A jury found the appellant guilty of disorderly intoxication and resisting arrest without violence, a lesser included offense.
To sustain a conviction for disorderly intoxication as described in section 856.-011(1), Florida Statutes, the state must prove not only that a person is intoxicated but that the public safety is endangered. State v. Holden, 299 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1974). In Blake v. State, 433 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the Holden standard was applied to reverse a conviction for disorderly intoxication where a defendant who smelled of alcohol was holding a can of beer, flapping his arms around, and “talking loudly, using profanity and causing ‘sort of a little disturbance.’ ” Blake at 612. In the instant case, appellant’s conduct prior to his arrest was no more culpable than the defendant in Blake. We, therefore, find that the conviction for disorderly intoxication must be reversed.
The appellant asserts that if his conviction for disorderly intoxication is reversed then he had a lawful right to resist an illegal arrest and that his conviction for resisting arrest without violence must be overturned. K.Y.E. v. State, 557 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). An arrest made for an incorrect charge, however, is not illegal if the officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for an independent charge. Blanding v. State, 446 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984).1 In the instant case, it is apparent from the record that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for trespass. See § 810.08(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). The arrest was, therefore, not illegal and the defendant’s conviction for resisting arrest may stand.
Appellant’s conviction for disorderly intoxication is reversed, but his conviction for resisting arrest without violence is affirmed.
WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . In K.Y.E. v. State, supra, the issue of whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for an independent charge was not addressed.
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Daniel v. Vill. OF Royal Palm Beach, 889 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…n arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time; if there is a valid charge for which a person could have been arrested, probable cause exists. See State v. Cote, 547 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Jernigan v. State, 566 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Gasset v. State, 490 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Daniel points to the existence of many factual disputes concerning her encounter with Deputy Sovich. However, these disputes are not material to the existence of probab…
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Palancar v. State, 204 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…ate proved that Palancar caused a public disturbance or endangered the public safety. Palanear’s belligerent behavior toward the officer is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish that he was causing a public disturbance. See Jernigan v. State, 566 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (holding that appellant’s use of profanity and aggressive behavior did not amount to disorderly intoxication); Blake v. State, 433 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that appellant’s “actions in talking loudly and f…
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Ivey v. State, 779 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…and the case is remanded with directions to vacate the conviction, because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish, as required by section 856.011(1), Florida Statutes (1999), that he caused “a public disturbance.” See Jernigan v. State, 566 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Blake v. State, 433 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). REVERSED and REMANDED. ERVIN, WEBSTER and LEWIS, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Blanding v. State, 446 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- K.Y.E. v. State, 557 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Kenton Anthony Blake v. State, 433 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- State v. Holden, 299 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1974)