KENNETH L. DAMES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kenneth Dames appealed his cocaine possession conviction, arguing the police stop that led to the discovery of the drug was unconstitutional. The Florida appellate court agreed, finding the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Dames and reversed the conviction.
The stop was unconstitutional because the officer's suspicion was too tenuous to justify the investigatory stop. The officer acted on mere hunch rather than founded suspicion, making the stop invalid and requiring suppression of all evidence obtained as a result.
[1] An investigatory stop is not justified by a mere hunch or suspicion that a drug transaction may have occurred, absent more specific indicators.
[2] A stop based on a defendant leaning into a car in a high-crime area and then walking away quickly upon seeing an officer is not supported by founded suspicion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the stop in the instant case was not warranted simply based upon the officer's observation of appellant, in a high-crime district, leaning into the window of a stopped car and his proceeding to walk away rapidly upon seeing the officer approach”
Establishes that conduct in high-crime area alone is insufficient for reasonable suspicion
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Riley observed Dames standing in the middle of the street leaning into a parked car's passenger window in a known drug area around noon. When …
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
The appeal before us for consideration is from a judgment and sentence for possession of cocaine. Although two issues are raised, our resolution of the first issue regarding the trial court’s denial of motions to suppress obviates our need to reach the second challenging the court’s denial of appellant’s motion for mistrial based on improper prosecutorial remarks. Since we agree with appellant that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress on the basis of an invalid investigatory stop, we must reverse.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Jacksonville Sheriff’s Officer R.A. Riley testified that he was on routine patrol around noon in a well-known drug area in Jacksonville when, upon turning a corner, he observed what he thought was a drug transaction. Appellant was allegedly standing in the middle of the street leaning into the passenger window of a blue Volkswagen. The driver of the Volkswagen apparently was the first to' spot Riley and immediately sped away leaving appellant standing in the middle of the street looking puzzled. Riley pulled his car next to appellant who at that point sighted him and began walking away swiftly. Riley did not know appellant, did not see any money or drugs change hands, and was not certain that a drug transaction had occurred, although he did testify that the typical drug transaction in the area took place by way of pedestrians leaning into stopped cars.
Upon approaching appellant, Riley stopped his car, jumped out and ordered appellant, whose back was to him, to show his hands, allegedly for purposes of a weapons check. Appellant raised his hands and turned around to face the officer. In doing so, according to Riley, appellant dropped a baggie of cocaine. (Appellant and a witness contended at trial that appellant did not drop the cocaine; rather, Officer Riley allegedly rummaged through the underbrush until he discovered a discarded baggie containing cocaine.)
As argued by appellant, the stop in the instant case was not warranted simply based upon the officer’s observation of appellant, in a high-crime district, leaning into the window of a stopped car and his proceeding to walk away rapidly upon seeing the officer approach. See State v. Hoover, 520 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); and Kearse v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Officer Riley’s suspicion of appellant was too tenuous to justify the stop. Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Rather, he acted on a mere hunch instead of on a founded suspicion, State v. Hoover, and because the stop was invalid, it follows that any statement appellant may have made and any evidence that may have been seized were tainted and should have been suppressed. Gipson.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motions to suppress. Consequently, appellant’s conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine is hereby
REVERSED.
BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur.
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Cited By (20 total)
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State v. Anderson, 591 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1992)…experience, that Anderson had engaged in criminal activity.2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The cases relied upon by the district court of appeal lack a similar combination of facts. See Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (defendant was observed in high crime area leaning into window of stopped car and walked away rapidly upon officer’s approach); Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (defendant approached car parked in lighted parki…
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State v. Paul, 638 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…te, 575 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (officer who observed defendant in a high-drug area picking something up from a young black male’s hand but who saw neither drugs nor money did not have a founded suspicion to detain defendant); Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (officer’s stop of defendant was not warranted by his observation of the defendant in a high-crime district leaning into the window of a stopped car and the defendant’s rapidly walking away upon seeing another officer approach).…
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Johnson v. State, 610 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…of criminal activity sufficient to warrant detention, as the officer observed no exchange of drugs, money, or anything else. See Bush v. State, 594 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Bolinger v. State, 576 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Dames v. State, 566 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Peabody v. State, 556 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Gipson. Cf. Winters v. State, 578 So. 2d 5, 6 (2d DCA), rev. den., 589 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1991) (temporary detention justified because officer saw defendant lean into vehicle an…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gipson v. State, 537 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Newman v. State, 384 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- State v. Hoover, 520 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)