GARRY M. GLICKMAN, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
CORALIE SCHERER, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT, AND JAMES P. O'FLARITY, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLEE
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An attorney sought to enforce a charging lien against fees for representing a client in a child custody modification case. The court reversed, holding that charging liens cannot attach to child custody, support, and visitation matters because they do not produce the tangible fruits of recovery necessary to support such liens.
The court reversed the trial court's enforcement of the charging lien, holding that charging liens cannot attach to child custody, visitation, and support matters because these do not produce tangible fruits of recovery. The court noted that while charging liens are readily enforced in marital dissolution cases involving asset transfers, child support specifically is not an asset subject to an attorney's charging lien.
[1] An attorney's charging lien requires a contract between the attorney and client, an understanding that payment is dependent on or will come from recovery, and an attempt…
[2] Proof of services rendered alone is insufficient to create an attorney's charging lien; the services must produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is not enough, however, to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services.”
Establishes the fundamental requirement that charging liens must attach to tangible fruits of recovery, not merely to services rendered.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceScherer retained an attorney to represent her in response to her former husband Glickman's suit seeking modification of custody of their minor child. …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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[*575] PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Garry Glickman (Glickman), and his former-wife, appellee, Coralie Scherer (Scherer), appeal from final judgments enforcing Scherer’s former attorney’s charging lien for services rendered in a suit for modification of final judgment of dissolution. We reverse.
Scherer retained appellee, an attorney, for representation in response to her former husband’s suit for modification. Glick-man’s suit sought a change in custody of the couples’ minor child. The attorney represented Scherer throughout trial and, with an appeal pending, withdrew, citing his client’s inability to pay. He then filed a notice of charging lien. Glickman and Scherer, thereafter, entered into an agreement, without notice to the former attorney, resolving their dispute and dismissing the appeal. The joint agreement modified child custody, visitation and support regarding the couples’ minor child.
The attorney filed a motion to enforce his charging lien and at the hearing offered evidence as to the reasonable value of his services rendered. The trial court enforced the charging lien by two separate judgments. The first judgment ordered Glick-man to pay $6,236.00 and held Scherer liable for any additional fees due and owing on the retainer agreement. The second judgment ordered Scherer to pay $6,607.29 in satisfaction of the additional fees.
The requirements for the imposition of a charging lien are:
1. There must be a contract between the attorney and client.
2. There must be an understanding, express or implied, between the parties that the payment is either dependent on recovery or that payment will come from the recovery.
3. The remedy is available where there has been an attempt to avoid the payment of fees, or a dispute as to the amount involved.
4. There are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond “timely notice.”
Zimmerman v. Livnat, 507 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (citing Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.1983)). Proof of services rendered is insufficient to create an attorney’s charging lien. The Third District in Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, P.A., 517 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 525 So. 2d 879 (1988) stated:
It is not enough, however, to support the imposition of a charging lien that an attorney has provided his services; the services must, in addition, produce a positive judgment or settlement for the client, since the lien will attach only to the tangible fruits of the services. And although it is said that a charging lien attaches to the judgment, where there are no proceeds of the judgment, there is nothing to which a lien may, as a practical matter attach.
Id. at 91-92 (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Charging liens are readily enforced in marital dissolution cases involving a transfer of assets. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 522 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). However, the nature of the representation in this case — child custody, child support and visitation — would not produce “tangible fruits” to which a lien may attach. Child support, the sole transfer of tangible proceeds here, is not subject to an attorney’s charging lien. Brake v. Sanchez-Lopez, 452 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (child support is not an asset to which a charging lien may attach).
We, therefore, reverse the final judgments ordering payment of the charging liens and remand this cause with directions to the trial court to dissolve the charging lien. Our reversal is without prejudice to Scherer’s former attorney’s right to exercise other remedies which may be available.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
LETTS, DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
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Franklin & Marbin, P.A. v. Mascola, 711 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ecause there was nothing recovered to which the lien could attach. And, in fact, the trial court found that there had been no recovery of any monetary relief in the paternity action and that the lien was therefore a nullity. See Glickman v. Scherer, 566 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Litman v. Fine Jacobson Schwartz Nash Block & England P.A., 517 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). Nevertheless, the trial court proceeded to rule that it had the discretion to determine the amount of fees due, citing our decision in…
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Shawzin v. Donald J. Sasser, P.A., 658 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…e as to the amount involved. (4) There are no requirements for perfecting a charging hen beyond timely notice. See Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983); see also Glickman v. Scherer, 566 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Zimmerman v. Livnat, 507 So. 2d 1205,1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Here, the representation contract unequivocally satisfies the first two elements for a charging hen. Likewise, the record clearly demonstrates a dispute as to t…
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LAW Offs. OF Sharon P. Talbot, P.A. v. Savoie, 705 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ellant’s right to exercise any other remedy which may be available to her. See Litman v. Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England, P.A., 517 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), review denied, 525 So. 2d 879 (Fla.1988); see also Glickman v. Scherer, 566 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). AFFIRMED. STONE, C.J., and GUNTHER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Sinclair v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983)
- Elliot v. State, 517 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Litman v. Fine, 517 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Hutchins v. Hutchins, 522 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Zimmerman v. Eliezer J. Livnat and Esther Livnat, 507 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Brake v. Sanchez-Lopez, 452 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)