NICK NAVARRO, AS SHERIFF OF BROWARD COUNTY, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE F. KOHAN, JR., APPELLEE
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Sheriff Navarro appealed the dismissal of a civil forfeiture proceeding against Kohan. The court reversed, holding that the sheriff established probable cause of Kohan's control of a vehicle containing contraband, shifting the burden to Kohan to prove a defense, and that the trial court erred by applying criminal standards of proof and improperly excluding Kohan's statements under a vehicle accident report privilege.
The court reversed the dismissal, holding that once probable cause is established that the respondent was in control of a vehicle containing contraband, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove a defense. The trial court erred by applying a criminal standard of proof in a civil forfeiture proceeding and erred in excluding respondent's statements under the accident report privilege, which does not extend to statements disclosing identity where the person subsequently denies involvement.
[1] A petitioner in a forfeiture proceeding establishes probable cause by demonstrating the respondent was in control of a vehicle containing contraband, thereby shifting the…
[2] Forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature, and a respondent does not meet their burden as a matter of law by merely raising a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature. Therefore, respondent does not meet his burden as a matter of law simply by raising a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”
Establishes that civil forfeiture proceedings use a civil standard of proof, not a criminal standard, and that raising a reasonable hypothesis of innocence is insufficient to meet the burden of proof.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKohan was found alone standing next to his vehicle on a highway median strip. He admitted ownership and control at the scene and claimed to be cut off…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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STONE, Judge.
We reverse an order dismissing a forfeiture proceeding. The record reflects that the petitioner established probable cause that the respondent tyas in control of his vehicle which contained contraband, shifting the burden to respondent to prove a defense. See Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, Section 932.701, et seq., Florida Statutes. See also In re Forfeiture of Approximately Forty-Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($48,900.00) in U.S. Currency, 432 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). See also United States v. One 1980 Stapleton Pleasure Vessel Named Threesome, Registration No. FL 4180EA, 575 F.Supp. 473 (S.D.Fla.1983).
The action was dismissed upon an evidentiary hearing on appellee’s motion,1 •prior to a final hearing, because the court determined that petitioner would not be able to establish respondent’s control of the vehicle. However, in doing so the trial court erred by applying a criminal standard of proof in weighing the circumstantial evidence. Forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature. Therefore, respondent does not meet his burden as a matter of law simply by raising a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
Additionally, the trial court erred in determining that appellee’s statements to the police at the scene of arrest could not be considered because they were privileged as an accident report pursuant to section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, which provides:
Each accident report made by a person involved in an accident shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state agencies having use of the records for accident prevention purposes, except that the department may disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when such identity is not otherwise known or when such person denies his presence at such accident.
The appellant was found alone standing next to his vehicle in a highway median strip. He admitted ownership and control at the scene, and claimed to be cut off by a phantom vehicle. However, appellant in this proceeding now denies his involvement in the “accident,” but claims to have been “present” by virtue of having arrived shortly after the car went onto the median.
In Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983), the supreme court held that the statutory privilege does not extend to statements disclosing identity where that person subsequently denies involvement. One who denies involvement in the incident or accident but claims “presence” only by virtue of subsequently arriving at the scene, can hardly claim the protection of the statutory privilege.
ANSTEAD, J„ and WILLIAM C. OWEN, Jr., Associate Judge, concur. . We note that the evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss was not authorized by procedural rules but that is not the issue raised on appeal.
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Kern v. State, 706 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…at is independent of any factually related criminal action. In re Forfeiture of 1987 Ford Escort v. Potts, 624 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); In re Forfeiture of 1986 Pontiac Firebird v. Burgess, 600 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Navarro v. Kohan, 566 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). See also § 932.704(2) (all civil forfeiture cases to be heard before a circuit judge of the civil division and the rules of civil procedure govern). Neither a conviction nor an acquittal in a criminal case is determinative of th…
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In re Forfeiture OF the following described Prop. TEN Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Eight Dollars ($10 v. Lazzara, 580 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)…ree that this same standard should apply to determine “due proof” under section 932.704, Florida Statutes (1989). Probable cause for civil forfeiture purposes, however, is not identical to probable cause for criminal purposes. See Navarro v. Kohan, 566 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[T]rial court erred in applying criminal standard of proof in weighing the circumstantial evidence.”). Instead, it is a civil standard which weighs evidence available at the time of the forfeiture proceeding rather than the evi…
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Ric L. Bradshaw v. McCORMICK, 182 So. 3d 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…it was error for the circuit court to grant summary judgment in favor of McCormick based on his plea to a misdemeanor in the related criminal case. Forfeitui’e proceedings are “civil in nature” and distinct from a criminal action. Navarro v. Kohan, 566 So. 2d 895, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). As a result,, the judgment in a criminal proceeding “is not admissible” in a forfeiture proceeding. Wille v. Karrh, 423 So. 2d 963, 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The essence of the holding in Witte is that the seizing agency in…
Authorities Cited
- Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1983)
- In re Forfeiture of Approximately Forty-Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($48, 432 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- United States v. One (1) 1980 Stapelton Pleasure Vessel Named Threesome, 575 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Fla. 1983)