WILLIAM DAVID ADAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
MARGARET I. ADAMS, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1990-08-08
No. 88-2432
GLICKSTEIN and WARNER, JJ., and JACK MUSSELMAN, Associate Judge, concur.
567 So. 2d 8 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1990) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the final judgment of dissolution but qualify the court’s treatment of a lot appellant held as trustee.

The trial court held that pursuant to section 689.07, Florida Statutes (1987), the appellant was the fee simple owner of the lot, and therefore it could be treated as marital property and granted to the wife as part of equitable distribution. The purpose of the statute was to prevent fraud on persons who might rely on the record title when dealing with the grantee. Arundel Debenture Corp. v. Leblond, 139 Fla. 668, 190 So. 765 (1939). The wife is not a third party dealing with the grantee and relying on the title. Her interest can only amount to whatever interest her husband acquired.

Therefore, the final judgment awarding her the lot can only be construed as awarding her appellant’s interest in the lot, whatever that may be.

Therefore, the court’s final judgment does not act as res judicata in proceedings between the wife and other beneficiaries who were not parties to this action. On the other hand, the wife is not precluded from contesting any trust arrangement, which apparently is what occurred in separate proceedings.

GLICKSTEIN and WARNER, JJ., and JACK MUSSELMAN, Associate Judge, concur.


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Cited By

  • Ira D. Giller and Anita Grossman v. Giller, 190 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …s’ Motion - for Summary Judgment, concluding that the -Personal Representatives lack standing to bring the action, Relying upon Raborn v. Menotte, 974 So. 2d 328 (Fla.2008), Callava v. Feinberg, 864 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), and Adams v. Adams, 567 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), the probate court held that “[t]he Personal Representatives are not ‘subsequent parties’ dealing with the properties which are the subject of the Action, and as a result are not entitled to the relief they seek under § 689.07(1)…

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