MARY ANN PATTI SETZER, APPELLANT,
v.
ROYCE WALTON SETZER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a marriage dissolution case, the trial court ordered the wife to amend the child's birth certificate to reflect the husband's surname, despite the wife being designated as the primary residential parent. The appellate court reversed this portion of the judgment, holding that Florida law grants the custodial parent the right to select the child's surname.
The trial court lacked authority to override the custodial parent's right to name the child. Florida law grants the parent with custody the right to select the child's surname when shared parental responsibility is ordered. The trial court did not err in refusing post-judgment alimony, as this decision was within its discretion.
[1] The parent with primary residential responsibility for a child has the sole authority to select the child's surname, even if the parents share parental responsibility.
[2] A trial court lacks the authority to override a custodial parent's decision regarding a child's surname.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the mother is married at the time of birth, the mother and the father as entered on the birth certificate shall select the given names and surname of the child if both parents will have custody of the child, otherwise, the parent who will have custody shall select the given names and surname of the child.”
Establishes the statutory framework giving the custodial parent the right to name the child
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties separated in January 1989. A child was born after separation but before the final judgment of dissolution in November 1989. At the time of…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Custodial Parent cases and more on FLexlaw
ALLEN, Judge.
One child was born of the marriage between the parties to this marriage dissolution action. The child was born after the parties separated in January of 1989, but before the entry of the final judgment of dissolution in November of 1989. At the time of the child’s birth, the wife used her maiden name as the child’s surname. The final judgment provided that the parties would have shared parental responsibility, but that the wife would be the primary residential parent. The final judgment also required the wife to cause the child’s birth certificate to be amended to change the child’s surname to that of the husband. On appeal, the wife contends that the trial court erred in requiring her to amend the child’s birth certificate. We agree and reverse that portion of the final judgment. We disagree, however, with the wife’s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her request for post-judgment alimony.
Section 382.013(5)(a), Florida Statutes, provides:
If the mother is married at the time of birth, the mother and the father as entered on the birth certificate shall select the given names and surname of the child if both parents will have custody of the child, otherwise, the parent who will have custody shall select the given names and surname of the child.
(Emphasis supplied). Although shared parental responsibility was ordered in this case, the wife was named as the primary residential parent. The primary residential parent is the custodial parent. Section 61.-046(1), Florida Statutes. Since the wife was the custodial parent, Section 382.-013(5)(a) gave her the right to name the child, and the trial court was without authority to override the wife’s decision.
The wife also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her request for post-judgment alimony. We find the decision on this issue to have been within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the final judgment requiring the wife to cause the child’s birth certificate to be amended, and we remand this cause to the trial court with directions that such provision be deleted from the final judgment. In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed.
ERVIN and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.