TRAVIS HARPER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Travis Harper was convicted of both unlawfully transporting funds with intent to promote an unlawful activity while armed and unlawfully purchasing a controlled substance. The court affirmed his convictions, rejecting his argument that the two offenses constitute the same offense under the double jeopardy clause.
The two offenses are not the same offense within the meaning of the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition. Each offense is based on a distinct and separate factual event, each has at least one element the other does not have, and each is aimed at a different evil.
[1] The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy does not bar prosecution for two offenses if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not.
[2] Two statutory offenses are not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes if they are based on distinct and separate factual events, even if those events are part of…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The two offenses are not "the same offense" within the meaning of the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition because each offense was based on a distinct and separate factual event although both factual events comprised part of one transaction or episode.”
Establishes that distinct factual events, even within one transaction, do not make offenses the same for double jeopardy purposes.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarper, while armed, carried cash to a controlled drug transaction where he participated with a co-perpetrator in purchasing marijuana from an underco…
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[*29] PER CURIAM.
This case involves the constitutional double jeopardy clause, the identity of offenses problem, the statutory offense of transportation of funds with intent to carry on an unlawful activity and the statutory offense of purchase of a controlled substance.
The defendant, while armed, carried cash to the scene of a controlled drug transaction where he participated with a co-perpetrator in the purchase of marijuana from an undercover police officer. He was convicted of the offense of unlawfully transporting funds with intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity while armed (a violation of sections 896.-101(2)(b)l and 775.087(l)(a), Florida Statutes), and the offense of the unlawful purchase of a controlled substance (a violation of sections 893.13(l)(a) and 893.03(l)(c)l, Florida Statutes). The defendant appeals contending that the two offenses are “the same offense” and that his conviction of both violated his constitutional double jeopardy rights. We disagree and affirm.
The two offenses are not “the same offense” within the meaning of the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition because each offense was based on a distinct and separate factual event although both factual events comprised part of one transaction or episode. Also, each offense has at least one element the other offense does not have. The drug purchasing offense does not have an element requiring the transportation of funds with a specific intent to the location of the drug purchase transaction and the funds transportation offense does not require a drug sale-purchase (or any other) transaction. In addition, each offense is aimed at a different evil: the drug purchase offense is aimed at prohibiting, penalizing and deterring drug transactions, while the funds transportation offense is aimed at prohibiting, penalizing and deterring the financing of “racketeering activity” (see sections 896.101(l)(g) and 895.02, Florida Statutes). The fact that a drug purchase can constitute a “specified unlawful activity” and a “racketeering activity” does not make the two offenses “the same offense” within the meaning of the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition.
AFFIRMED.
COWART, GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur.
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Dallas v. State, 995 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…as transported $4 in currency with the intent to promote the delivery of cocaine that he had just committed. Dallas argues that the statute does not [*1064] encompass an intent to promote a crime that has already been committed. In Harper v. State, 567 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), the defendant carried cash to purchase drugs from an undercover police officer. We rejected the defendant’s claim that his convictions for unlawful purchase of a controlled substance and unlawfully transporting funds with intent…