ADAM DAVIS
v.
ANGELA LEA DAVIS N/K/A ANGELA GRIFFIN
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's order modifying timesharing and granting relocation because the trial court failed to make specific factual findings required by statute regarding the best interests of the children. The case highlights the importance of detailed findings for appellate review.
Yes, the trial court erred by failing to make the required statutory findings concerning the best interests of the children and the material and unanticipated nature of the change in circumstances.
[1] A modification of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule requires a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circums…
[2] The best interests of the child must be the primary consideration when establishing or modifying parental responsibility and creating or modifying a parenting plan, inclu…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child.”
This quote states the statutory requirements for modifying a parenting plan or time-sharing schedule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court modified a timesharing schedule and granted a petition for relocation. The father appealed, arguing the court failed to make statutory…
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SMITH, J.
Appellant, Adam Davis (“Father”), appeals the trial court’s supplemental final judgment modifying timesharing and granting petition for relocation in favor of Appellee, Angela Lea Davis n/k/a Angela Griffin (“Mother”).1 His appeal is timely, and this Court has jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Father asserts that the trial court failed to set forth the statutory findings for the best interests of the minor children as required by section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes (2022). The statute provides, in pertinent part: For purposes of establishing or modifying parental responsibility and creating, developing, approving, or modifying a parenting plan, including a time-sharing schedule, which governs each parent’s relationship with his or her minor child and the relationship between each parent with regard to his or her minor child, the best interest of the child shall be the primary consideration. A determination of parental responsibility, a parenting plan, or a time-sharing schedule may not be modified without a showing of a substantial, material, and unanticipated change in circumstances and a determination that the modification is in the best interests of the child. Determination of the best interests of the child shall be made by evaluating all of the factors affecting the welfare and interests of the particular minor child and the circumstances of that family, including, but not limited to: [factors (a) through (t)].
Id.
The lower court held an evidentiary hearing on Mother’s supplemental petition to modify final judgment. The court outlined the various witnesses’ testimony, expressly found, “there is a substantial change in circumstances,” then
set forth the modification to the prior timesharing schedule. The lower court’s order failed to make any factual findings relative to the statutory factors set forth in section 61.13. While the court found there was a “substantial” change in circumstances, the court did not set forth a finding that the change in circumstances was “material” or “unanticipated.” Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact. Brown v. Brown, 239 So. 3d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (“[B]ecause the record does not contain adequate factual findings for this court to conduct meaningful appellate review of the parental time-sharing schedule, we reverse the amended parenting plan and remand for the trial court to make the necessary factual findings.”). Upon remand, we leave the decision to the trial court to determine whether the current record is sufficient to resolve these issues or whether additional evidence is needed. Id. REVERSED and REMANDED.
TRAVER and MIZE, JJ., concur. Dennis R. Wallace, II, of Wallace Law Firm, Punta Gorda, for Appellant.
Stacy L. Haverfield, of Stacy L. Haverfield, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellee.