DEBORAH SUE BEAUCHAMP

v.

PREN BEAUCHAMP

COHEN, J.

Deborah Sue Beauchamp, (“Former Wife”), appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered April 19, 2022.1 Former Wife argues that the trial

court erred by (1) not awarding her permanent alimony, (2) inequitably distributing assets, and (3) not awarding her attorney fees and costs. The parties were married on November 11, 2011. Former Wife suffered from anxiety and depression during the span of the marriage, and, by the time of dissolution, she was unemployed. Former Wife worked until 2019, when she left her position because of a separate health issue.

In December of 2020, Pren Beauchamp, (“Former Husband”), moved out of the marital home after it appeared Former Wife attempted suicide. After Former Husband moved out, he split three joint bank accounts between the two of them, leaving Former Wife with $106,000 and himself $104,000. Former Husband filed for dissolution on December 29, 2020. The parties attempted to equitably divided their assets before the final hearing, and, except for two boats, they were successful. The parties owned a Glacier Bay and a Wahoo. Former Husband was able to sell the Glacier Bay for $32,500, and he split the money between the two of them at $16,250 apiece. Former Wife then offered to buy Former Husband out of his portion of the Wahoo, which the parties valued at $6,000. Former Wife paid Former Husband $3,000 and was left with a surplus of $13,250 from the two assets, which she deposited into her account. Over the course of the dissolution, Former Wife used funds from the initial distribution of $106,000 to pay for living expenses. Former Wife testified that she had $78,000 in her account at the time of the final hearing, but that amount also included the $13,250 from the sale of the Glacier Bay.

At the final hearing, Former Wife introduced a deposition transcript of a licensed mental health counselor who testified as to Former Wife’s decompensation in mental health. Former Husband’s vocational expert, after having the benefit of reviewing the transcript, testified that Former Wife is unable to work. Former Wife’s expert and Former Wife testified to the longstanding and chronic nature of her mental health issues. Having heard the evidence, the trial court entered a final judgment. The court found that Former Wife needed, and Former Husband was able to pay alimony. See § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. (2020).

The court found also that Former Wife was unable to work and declined to impute income to her. The court declined to award Former Wife permanent alimony, however, finding that there was “no clear and convincing evidence that the Wife’s current mental health condition is permanent.” Former Wife’s expert having opined that she would find “anxiety relief” after the dissolution, the court awarded durational alimony of “$2,000 per month, beginning the month following the sale of the marital home and ending on July 31, 2024. At that point, the Wife will reach the age of 59.5 years and be eligible to draw from her retirement without penalty.” As to attorney fees, the final judgment noted that the parties will be “similarly situated after equitable distribution,” and the court declined to find that Former Wife had the need.

Finally, as to equitable distribution, the trial court found that Former Wife received $106,000 in funds from Former Husband when they initially split and, of those funds, she had $78,000 remaining, using a portion for reasonable and necessary expenses.

However, the final judgment made no mention of the $13,250 that was previously deposited, and the equitable distribution worksheet included a section for the two boats as well as the total $78,000 from Former Wife’s account. Alimony A trial court’s decision to award alimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980); Fichtel v. Fichtel, 141 So. 3d 593, 595 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

When exercising that discretion, the court must follow the applicable law. See Berger v. Berger, 201 So. 3d 819, 821 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). “The purpose of permanent alimony is to ‘provide the needs and the necessities of life to a former spouse as they have been established by the marriage of the parties.’” Motie v. Motie, 132 So. 3d 1210, 1213 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (quoting Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201). “The purpose of durational alimony is to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time[.]” Motie, 132 So. 3d at 1213. In a moderate term marriage, as is the case here, there is no presumption for or against an award of permanent periodic alimony for a spouse in need. Winder v. Winder, 152 So. 3d 836, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). “Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage . . . of moderate duration if such an award is appropriate based upon clear and convincing evidence[.]” § 61.08(8), Fla. Stat. (2020).

Former Wife argues that the trial court should have awarded her permanent alimony.

We disagree.

The trial court made findings associated with each factor in section 61.08(2) and determined Former Wife’s claim for permanent periodic alimony wanting in light of the substantial assets she received.

The trial court is required to consider “nonmarital and the marital assets . . . distributed to each” in determining the amount of alimony. § 61.08(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2020).

Additionally, the trial court was not convinced that Former Wife’s condition was permanent, such that an award of permanent alimony would be warranted.

Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the judgment. Equitable Distribution The trial court’s equitable distribution decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Soria v. Soria, 237 So. 3d 454, 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). Former Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that Former Wife’s cash assets totaled $78,000 when that number also included cash from the sale of the parties’ boat.

We agree and remand for recalculation of equitable distribution.

Attorney Fees The standard of review for an award or denial of attorney fees in a dissolution of marriage action is abuse of discretion. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). “[T]he most important factor in awarding attorney’s fees is the financial resources of each party.” Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1997). Here, Former Wife received sufficient assets as a result of the equitable distribution. We do not find an abuse of discretion in denying her request for attorney fees. See Lovell v. Lovell, 14 So. 3d 1111, 1117 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Conclusion We reverse the final judgment with respect to the equitable distribution issue outlined above.

The trial court is directed to rework the equitable distribution so that the money from the sale of the Glacier Bay is properly reflected. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. TRAVER C.J., and NARDELLA, J., concur. Allison M. Perry, of Florida Appeals, P.A., Tampa, and Linda H. Fried, of Fried & Fried, P.A., Ft. Myers, for Appellant. Heidi J. Bassett, of Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, for Appellee.