JENNIFER SANT ANGELO HUGHES AND CHRISTOPHER SANT ANGELO

v.

CARLA MARIE SANT ANGELO

NARDELLA, J.

Jennifer Sant Angelo Hughes and Christopher Sant Angelo (collectively, “Decedent’s children”) appeal the involuntary dismissal of their claims for declaratory relief and reformation of a antenuptial agreement between their father, Daniel Sant Angelo (“Decedent”), and their stepmother, Carla Sant Angelo (“wife”).¹ Because the trial court erred by finding the wife did not waive her right

to serve as personal representative of Decedent’s estate, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm. Decedent and his wife, both of whom had children from prior marriages, executed an antenuptial agreement (“Agreement”) before their wedding in 2005. The agreement contained the following relevant provisions: 2.04. The parties do hereby further admit and acknowledge that each fully understands the issues addressed in this agreement and any legal rights they may be waiving as a result of entering into this agreement, including, but without limitation, . . . the right of a surviving spouse to act as personal representative of a deceased spouse estate for a fee . . ..

3.01. Except as herein provided, the parties do hereby covenant and agree with each other that they will either during their lifetime nor after the other parties death, take, claim, demand, or receive, and do hereby waive and release all rights, claims, titles, and interests, actual, inchoate, or contingent, at law and in equity which they might, by reason of their marriage, acquire in each others property or estate.… (emphasis added)

3.07. Each party consents that the estate of the other may be disposed of by will or codicil to any heirs of the other party, or in absence of a will or codicil, the estate of each party shall descend to the heirs of that party as if the marriage had taken place, except that Daniel shall devise to Carla the marital Home in Lorida and the surrounding 5 acres.

After sixteen years of marriage, Decedent died intestate without ever nominating a personal representative of his estate. After his death, his wife filed a petition to administer his estate and requested that the circuit court appoint her as the personal representative. His children, however, objected and argued that she waived her right to serve as personal representative when she executed the Agreement.

Ultimately, the trial court disagreed. Relying upon the specific/general canon of construction, the trial court disregarded paragraphs 2.04 and 3.01, finding they were general provisions trumped by paragraph 3.07, which it found to be a “specific provision.” On appeal, Decedent’s children challenge the trial court’s determination and argue again that the wife waived her right to serve as the personal representative of Decedent’s estate pursuant to paragraphs 2.04 and 3.01 of the Agreement. Our review is de novo.

Section 733.301(1), Florida Statutes (2022), sets forth the order of preference which shall be observed in the appointment of a personal representative. When a decedent dies intestate, as was the case here, the surviving spouse ranks first in the statute’s order of preference for appointment as the personal representative. § 733.301(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2022).

But this right, like most, can be waived by contract. In fact, Florida statute section 732.702 provides for waiver and states that “[t]he rights of a surviving spouse to [a] . . . preference in appointment as personal representative of an intestate estate . . . may be waived . . . by a written . . . agreement [that provides for the] . . . waiver of ‘all rights,’ . . . [which is construed as] a waiver of all rights to [a] . . . preference in appointment as personal representative of an intestate estate . . . .” § 732.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2022).

Considering section 732.702, the parties agreed, and the trial court found, that paragraph 3.01 was a general waiver of “all rights,” which necessarily included the right of a surviving spouse to act as personal representative. Despite this recognition, the trial court reasoned that the general waiver found in paragraphs 2.04 and 3.01 was undone by paragraph 3.07, which it found to be a specific provision reinstituting the wife’s right to be treated as Decedent’s surviving spouse if he died intestate. This finding, however, reads paragraph 3.07 too broadly. Paragraph 3.07, at most, simply revives the wife’s right to take under the laws of intestacy. And the right to take a share of her husband’s estate is different in kind from the right to administer her husband’s estate. See generally DeVaughn v. DeVaughn, 840 So. 2d 1128, 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

In other words, paragraph 3.07 never addresses the wife’s statutory preference for appointment as personal representative. Since paragraph 3.07 does not conflict with the portions of paragraphs 2.04 and 3.01 that waive the wife’s right to act as personal representative, the specific/general canon, which requires the presence of conflicting provisions, does not apply in this situation. See Fla. Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc., 148 So. 3d 97, 102 (Fla. 2014) (requiring a conflict between different provisions for the specific/general canon to apply); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012).

As such, the trial court erred by applying that canon to find paragraph 3.07 revived the wife’s right to administer the Decedent’s estate as its personal representative.

Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings.

STARGEL and WHITE, JJ., concur. Nicolás A. Apfelbaum, of Apfelbaum Law, Port St. Lucie, for Appellants.

James V. Lobozzo, Jr., of James V. Lobozzo, Jr., P.A., Avon Park, for Appellee.