IRVING PELHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Irving Pelham was convicted of attempted second-degree murder and attempted robbery, but the Florida appellate court reversed his convictions and remanded for a new trial because the trial judge erred in excluding his alibi witness based solely on a misspelling of the witness's name in the notice of alibi.
A trial court commits reversible error when it summarily excludes an alibi witness based on a misspelling in the notice of alibi without making findings regarding prejudice to the opposing party or considering alternative procedures to rectify any prejudice. Exclusion should only occur under the most compelling circumstances when the omission cannot be otherwise remedied.
[1] A trial court commits reversible error by summarily excluding an alibi witness based solely on a misspelling of the witness's name in the notice of intent to claim alibi,…
[2] When a defendant violates the notice of alibi rule, the trial court must conduct a careful inquiry into the reasons for the disclosure's failure, the extent of prejudice…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a violation of the notice of alibi rule is analogous to a failure to furnish witnesses under rule 3.220 and the matter should be treated as a rule 3.220 violation in the manner prescribed in Richardson v. State”
Establishes the proper legal standard for handling alibi rule violations, requiring courts to consider prejudice and remedies rather than summary exclusion
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defense provided notice of intent to claim alibi listing a witness as 'Byron LeKeith Myron.' On the morning of the third day of trial, the state r…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges his convictions and sentences for attempted second degree murder and attempted robbery. Finding that the trial judge reversibly erred in excluding the appellant’s alibi witness from testifying, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
The state filed in this case a demand for notice of intention to claim alibi. In response to that motion, about a month before the trial, defense counsel filed a notice of intent to claim alibi. He listed an alibi witness named “Byron LeKeith Myron.”
On the morning of the third day of trial, the state asserted that the witness named in the notice of intent to claim alibi should not be allowed to testify because the man’s actual name, which the state represented it just found out that morning, was Byron Myrick. The state asserted that there was no way the prosecution could have been able to locate the man with an improper name. The notice of alibi rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.200, expressly states that if the name of an alibi witness as particularly as is known to the defendant or his attorney is not stated in the notice, the court may exclude the testimony of that witness. The trial judge in this case followed the literal language of rule 3.200 and summarily excluded the appellant’s alibi witness because the name was misspelled.
In Bell v. State, 287 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), this court considered a situa tion similar to that in the instant case. In Bell, the trial court had refused to permit a person to be called as a witness because of the failure to include that person’s name on the notice of intent to claim alibi. The court noted the express language of the rule, and also noted that the last sentence of the rule provides “for good cause shown the court may waive the, requirements of this rule.”
In Bell, the court concluded that a violation of the notice of alibi rule is analogous to a failure to furnish witnesses under rule 3.220 and the matter should be treated as a rule 3.220 violation in the manner prescribed in Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1971). Bell adopts the view that when there is a violation of the notice of alibi rule, the trial court should make a careful inquiry as to why the disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice to the other party and the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by some intermediate procedure. Thus the court approved the view that while the rule describes the possibility that the court may prohibit witnesses from testifying, this should be done only under the most compelling circumstances and where the omission cannot be otherwise remedied. In Austin v. State, 461 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the First District Court of Appeal discusses some alternatives which a trial court should consider before excluding an alibi witness.
In the present case, the trial judge made no finding as to whether the state was actually prejudiced by the misspelling of the witness’s name. Even worse, the trial judge considered no alternative for rectifying that prejudice short of excluding the testimony of the alibi witness. The trial judge thus committed error under the rule adopted by this court in Bell v. State.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and HALL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Small v. State, 608 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA1974), where the court held that exclusion of testimony of defendant’s alibi witness without first inquiring into circumstances surrounding his failure to comply with rule 3.200 was an abuse of discretion. See also Pelham v. State, 567 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA1990); Bell v. State, 287 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA1974). Accordingly, we temporarily remand the case to the trial court with directions that a hearing be held to determine whether or not good cause existed to waive the requirements of r…
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Stefan A. Armstrong v. State, 931 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…ing Dutka as a witness. See Lee v. State, 534 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (it is within a trial court’s discretion to order exclusion of a witness as a sanction for violation of a discovery order). The cases cited by Armstrong, Pelham v. State, 567 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1990), Austin v. State, 461 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and Bell v. State, 287 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1974), do not involve the violation of a court order to produce a witness. In addition, Pelham and Bell have been undercut by S…
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Small v. State, 640 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)…679 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), where the court held that exclusion of testimony of defendant’s alibi witness without first inquiring into circumstances surrounding his failure to comply with rule 3.200 was an abuse of discretion. See also Pelham v. State, 567 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Bell v. State, 287 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Accordingly, we temporarily remand the case to the trial court with directions that a hearing be held to determine whether or not good cause existed to waive the requirements of…
Authorities Cited
- Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971)
- Austin v. State, 461 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Bell v. State, 287 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)