RICHARD CALVIN JONES, II

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

PRATT, J.

Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to one count of trafficking in fourteen grams or more of fentanyl, one count of trafficking in 200 grams or more of phenethylamines, one count of possession of a firearm in commission of a felony, one count of possession of any place, structure, trailer or conveyance for trafficking in a controlled substance, one count of delivery or possession with intent to deliver or manufacture of drug paraphernalia, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In doing so, he reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i). On appeal, Appellant asserts that law enforcement's warrantless search of his vehicle fails to satisfy the protective sweep exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Alternatively, he argues that even if the protective sweep exception applies, the plain view exception does not and that the evidence of his crimes observed by law enforcement during the protective sweep of his vehicle should therefore be suppressed.

At the evidentiary hearing held on Appellant's motion to suppress, the evidence presented showed among other things that Appellant had previously fled from a traffic stop after law enforcement observed narcotics in his vehicle; that an arrest warrant was subsequently issued for Appellant for fleeing and eluding; that prior to arresting Appellant for fleeing and eluding law enforcement conducted an investigatory background check that revealed Appellant had multiple felony convictions and firearms charges and was on probation for narcotics trafficking; that law enforcement arrived at Appellant's residence to conduct surveillance a few weeks after the traffic stop; that upon arriving at Appellant's residence law enforcement observed that Appellant's vehicle was already present and running and that Appellant and another individual exited and reentered the vehicle with Appellant as the driver and the other individual as a passenger; that law enforcement could not determine if anyone else was inside the vehicle during the approximately fifteen minutes of surveillance of the vehicle and residence; that after Appellant drove the vehicle from the residence law enforcement decided to follow the vehicle until Appellant exited the vehicle for a safer apprehension; that law enforcement arrested Appellant outside of a gas station after he exited the vehicle; that law enforcement moved behind the cover of a law enforcement vehicle after observing furtive movements through the tinted windows¹ of Appellant's vehicle; that law enforcement called out for anyone inside the vehicle to exit and that a passenger exited the vehicle, closed one of the passenger doors, and was detained; that the passenger told law enforcement no one else was in the vehicle but law enforcement did not trust her statement in part because the passenger denied knowing Appellant; that law enforcement cautiously approached the vehicle with guns drawn; that law enforcement opened two of the passenger doors of Appellant's tinted vehicle and conducted a brief protective sweep of the vehicle out of concern for officer safety

Having considered the parties' arguments, the record on appeal, and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search of Appellant's vehicle by law enforcement, we affirm the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress based on the protective sweep and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (holding that established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement “ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle's recent occupant justify a search"); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 337 (1990) (“A ‘protective sweep' is a quick and limited search

AFFIRMED.

STARGEL and MIZE, JJ., concur. William R. Ponall and Eric J. Sorice, of Ponall Law, Maitland, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.