GREGORY WAYNE EVANS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Gregory Wayne Evans entered nolo contendere pleas with the state and sentencing court's agreement that he would receive no more than a three-year minimum mandatory sentence. When the trial court instead sentenced him to six years, he appealed. The appellate court held that while sentencing courts generally cannot depart downward from guidelines without state objection, plea agreements provide valid justification for downward departure, and remanded for the trial court to either allow him to withdraw his pleas, obtain the agreed-upon sentence, or secure voluntary affirmation of his pleas with knowledge of the actual sentence.
A plea agreement between the state and defendant provides valid justification for a downward departure from sentencing guidelines, and a trial court was free to impose a sentence in accordance with such a plea agreement. When a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere as quid pro quo for a promised maximum sentence, before a more serious sentence is imposed, the sentencing court must extend the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea or to voluntarily maintain his plea with knowledge that he will not receive the promised sentence.
[1] A plea agreement between the State and a defendant is a valid justification for a downward departure from sentencing guidelines.
[2] A sentencing court must offer a defendant the opportunity to withdraw their plea or agree to proceed with the plea knowing they will not receive a promised maximum senten…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although a sentencing court is not free to sentence below the sentencing guidelines over the State's objection, a plea agreement between the State and the defendant is a valid justification for a downward departure from the guidelines.”
Establishes that plea agreements provide valid grounds for downward departure from sentencing guidelines despite the general rule limiting such departures.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAt the time Evans entered his pleas of nolo contendere, both the state attorney and the sentencing court agreed he would be sentenced to incarceration…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Opportunity To Withdraw Plea cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
At the time the defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere the state attorney and the sentencing court agreed the defendant would be sentenced to incarceration for no more than an applicable three year minimum mandatory sentence. However, the defendant was later sentenced to six years incarceration which was within the statutory máximums and within the recommended guidelines sentence of 5V2-7 years incarceration. He appeals.
Although a sentencing court is not free to sentence below the sentencing guidelines over the State’s objection, a plea agreement between the State and the defendant is a valid justification for a downward departure from the guidelines.1 Accordingly, in this case the trial court was free to impose a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement.
A defendant is not entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement but if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere as quid pro quo for a promised maximum sentence, before a more serious sentence is imposed on the defendant as a result of his plea, the sentencing court should extend to the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea or to agree to maintain his plea with the knowledge that he will not receive the promised sentence.
Rather than disadvantage the defendant or the State by vacating the sentence at this level, we remand the case with directions that the sentencing court either (1) give the State an opportunity to ascertain if the defendant, with the advice of counsel and knowledge that he can withdraw his pleas, desires to voluntarily adhere to his pleas and agrees to the sentences as imposed, (2) vacate the sentences imposed and impose a downward departure sentence in accordance with the plea agreement, or (3) extend to the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his pleas.
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
COWART, GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . See State v. Esbenshade, 493 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bolling v. State, 631 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…equired to afford the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his nolo contendere pleas in Circuit Court Case Numbers 92-1196 and 92-1066 or agree to maintain the pleas with knowledge that he would receive the more severe sentence. See Evans v. State, 567 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). See also Rodriguez v. State, 610 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). It is clear from the prosecution of this appeal that the defendant does not agree with the more severe sentence. Thus, the cause is remanded with instructions that…
-
Jernigan v. State, 608 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…ent. A trial court is not obligated to accept a plea agreement which binds it to a specific sentence, Fairweather v. State, 505 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). The defendant is not entitled to specific performance of a plea agreement, Evans v. State, 567 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Thus, rejection of the plea agreement is in the nature of an adverse judicial ruling, and such rulings will not serve as a basis for disqualification. Gieseke v. Grossman, 418 So. 2d 1055, 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Upon conside…
-
Forrester v. State, 580 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…ave been permitted to withdraw his plea. If the trial court was unwilling to follow the plea agreement and impose probation without confinement as a condition, the defendant should have been permitted to have withdrawn his plea. See Evans v. State, 567 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). The State on appeal asserts in its brief that this issue has become moot because the defendant has effectively served the jail term and has been released from confinement. We decline to consider the matter moot. Although this c…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- Claydean Goggans v. Kalp, 493 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)